

GETTYSBURG STAFF RIDE

BRIEFING BOOK



U.S. ARMY CENTER
OF
MILITARY HISTORY

FOREWORD

**Buford came to Gettysburg late one night
Riding west with his brigades of blue horses,
While Pettigrew with his North Carolinians
Were moving east toward the town with a wagon train,
Hoping to capture shoes. The two came in touch.**

Benet, John Brown's Body

If neither General Meade nor General Lee planned to fight at Gettysburg, how did it happen that the first three days of July 1863 were to become arguably the most important span in the Civil War? That question cannot be fully answered without viewing McPherson's Ridge or Oak Hill, nor can one really understand the urgency of Chamberlain's bayonet charge nor the audacity of Pickett's division at the Angle without visiting those places.

Accordingly, the purpose of a Gettysburg staff ride is to visit these and other locations on the battlefield and analyze the battle through the eyes of the men who were there, both leaders and rank and file soldiers. Hopefully, by understanding the actions, inactions and reactions of commanders and their troops in real situations we may gain insights into the human condition under stress and decision making during combat.

In 1906, Major Eben Swift took twelve officer-students from Fort Leavenworth's General Service and Staff School to the Chickamauga Battlefield on the Army's first staff ride. Since then staff rides have been used to varying degrees in the education of Army officers, usually in the formal school system to add realism to training and narrow the gap between peacetime and war. The staff ride, therefore, not only assists participants to understand the realities of war, it is mental training for warfighting. Indirectly, it enhances unit readiness.

In summary, the staff ride is a training method which commanders can use for the professional development of their subordinates and to enliven the unit's esprit de corps - constant objectives of all commanders in peacetime.

At some time in their careers most officers have memorized the in-vogue principles and maxims of military art, probably without fully understanding or analyzing them. Now, whether you think of yourself as a tactician, operational artist, strategist, or just a soldier as you walk the battlefield, you should search for those principles and human characteristics which do not change over time. Place yourself in the minds of the leaders in the battle, analyze their decisions and determine if they could have done better. In this way you can fix in your mind the principles and thought processes that must be second nature to you in the crisis of combat.

We are convinced that the staff ride is the one of the best ways to do this.

Billy Arthur

Ted Ballard

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THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN

"Extracted from The West Point Atlas of American Wars, Volume I, 1689-1900, and printed with permission of the Department of History, U.S. Military Academy."

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Following the Battle of Chancellorsville, Hooker's and Lee's contending armies resumed their former positions along the opposite banks of the Rappahannock River. Hooker was temporarily restricted to the mission of ensuring the safety of Harpers Ferry and Washington. On the Confederate side, morale was at its highest pitch. Chancellorsville had been a deceptive victory; a feeling of invincibility spread through the Army of Northern Virginia.

It was now a far stronger army than the one Hooker had faced at Chancellorsville. The Confederacy's conscription enabled Lee to fill up his weakened veteran regiments, and new, relatively untrained regiments were brought up from the Carolinas. Accordingly, he had reorganized the Army of Northern Virginia into three infantry corps--commanded respectively by Longstreet, Ewell, and A. P. Hill--and Stuart's oversized cavalry division. (It might be well to note here that, for at least the first three years of the war, the average Southern corps and division had almost twice as many men as their Northern counterparts.) Each division now had its own battalion of artillery. The whole organization was efficient and flexible, but the excellent combat units were not backed up by well-organized staffs or an efficient service of supply.

The over-all military situation shown here was not promising for the Confederacy. The Army of the Potomac was still strong, and Lee knew that it was only a matter of time until it would launch a new offensive. The Federal naval blockade was becoming increasingly tight, and one after another of the Southern seaports was being occupied in a series of minor amphibious operations. Though such expeditions drew troops from the main Federal armies, they also pinned down almost equal numbers of Confederates and provided beachheads from which attacks inland might be launched.

In the center, Rosecrans and Bragg neutralized one another for the time being, but the war along the Mississippi River was definitely being lost by the Confederacy. Grant, after several failures, had driven Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton into Vicksburg, where he now held him under siege. Downstream, New Orleans had been captured by Rear Admiral David G. Farragut in April, 1862, and now Banks (of Shenandoah Valley experience) was besieging Port Hudson. Only between Vicksburg and Port Hudson could the eastern and western sections of the Confederacy maintain a tenuous connection--and this only in the absence of prowling Federal gunboats. Lee had skillfully defended the Confederacy's front door, but behind him various Federal commanders were steadily making serious inroads.

There were operations in minor theaters. Pope was stamping out a major Sioux uprising. War with other tribes flickered across the trails to California, killing soldiers as effectively as Chancellorsville or Shiloh (and sometimes far more brutally). In Missouri, Kansas, and Arkansas, an even more savage guerrilla struggle smoldered; neither side fought a

"gentlemen's war," the Confederate effort in particular being tainted by gangs of professional criminals, such as that of Charles Quantrill.

In Virginia, Longstreet weighed the situation of the Confederacy and offered a solution--to consider the war as a whole, instead of as a series of separate theaters. He reasoned: the South still retained interior lines and could therefore shift troops by railroad from one theater to another faster than the Federals could; Lee could leave Ewell and Hill to contain Hooker, move west with Longstreet's corps and all other available eastern troops, incorporate Bragg's, Buckner's, and Johnston's forces into his army, and throw the whole against Rosecrans; a victory there would paralyze the North; Grant undoubtedly would be recalled from Vicksburg.


This proposal had possibilities, though it overrated the capabilities of the Confederate railroads. But Lee had gone to war primarily to defend Virginia, and he hesitated to concern himself with matters outside the area of his command. Lee's own plan was simple: defensive strategy would never win the war; therefore, invade the North. Hooker's position was too strong to attack, but the threat of an invasion would force him to leave it. That done, Lee was confident of inflicting a decisive defeat upon him which might end the war. Also, between natural shortages and chronic ineptness of the Confederate supply system, Lee's troops were in constant want. Across the river, in Maryland and Pennsylvania, there were ample resources of food and clothing.

So Lee began shifting his army quietly westward for an advance up the Shenandoah and Cumberland Valleys. By holding the passes in the Blue Ridge and South Mountains, he could both screen his advance and protect his supply line. A. P. Hill's corps remained around Fredericksburg, spread thin to keep Hooker thinking that the whole Confederate army was still there.

Hooker's nerve might fail in a crisis, but he had the instincts of a good commander, and his staff included an efficient intelligence section. By late May, he had indications of Lee's general plan. His first reaction (5 June) was to cross the river as soon as Lee moved west and to attack A. P. Hill. His second inspiration (10 June) was to move directly on Richmond. Lincoln and Halleck vetoed both plans, stating that Lee's main army must be the objective. On 5-6 June, Hooker sent Sedgwick across the river to test the Confederate strength in the Fredericksburg area. Hill reacted aggressively and convinced Sedgwick that the main Confederate army was still there. Dissatisfied with this report, Hooker ordered Pleasonton (now commanding the Cavalry Corps) on a reconnaissance toward Culpeper.

Stuart's cavalry division lay at Brandy Station with orders to march west on 10 June. Early on 9 June, Pleasonton suddenly arrived, taking Stuart completely by surprise. This started the biggest cavalry fight in American history--a highly confused affair with some 10,000 sabers on each side. Late in the afternoon, Stuart slowly began to get the upper hand, and Confederate infantry appeared. Pleasonton therefore withdrew--his mission accomplished--to report that large forces of infantry were around Culpeper and that Stuart had marching orders. Stuart did not pursue. This fight encouraged Federal cavalrymen. Though they had frequently done as well, or better, this was their biggest fight yet.

Hooker began shifting his forces farther west. On the 13th, at last certain that Lee was moving into the Shenandoah, he moved his army swiftly and efficiently toward Manassas. As his rear guard left Falmouth, (Fredericksburg), A. P. Hill followed Lee. **(MAP 1)**



Maj. Gen. Robert H. Milroy, at Winchester, had innocently reported a big Confederate "raid" building up to his south. On 10 June, he received orders to withdraw to Harper's Ferry, but was slow to obey. Consequently, Ewell almost bagged him (12-15 June), Milroy losing over a third of his command and all his guns. The survivors and other small Federal garrisons in the area concentrated on Maryland Heights. Stanton called for militia from the surrounding states, but only New York could furnish any appreciable number.

By 17 June, the Confederates were strung over a distance of 100 miles. By 24 June, they had closed up north of the Potomac and on that day Hooker set his Army of Potomac in motion toward Frederick, Maryland. Brig. Gen. John D. Imboden's cavalry brigade raided westward to damage the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad and collect livestock. Stuart screened the right flank of Lee's advance as far as the Potomac, and at the same time tried to watch Hooker's movements. But Pleasonton, in a series of fights along the eastern slopes of the Blue Ridge Mountains, prevented him from obtaining information. Lee, therefore, remained in ignorance of Hooker's whereabouts, while Hooker's scouts north of the Potomac had little trouble determining Lee's numbers and line of march.

On 27 June, Hooker had the Army of the Potomac concentrated between Frederick and South Mountain and had ordered cavalry sent forward toward Emmitsburg and Gettysburg. He appears to have been planning an operation against Lee's line of communications but had issued no definite orders. So far, he had handled his army expertly, but his relations with Halleck--and even with Lincoln--were becoming increasingly tense. The President and his general in chief have been frequently criticized for being so nervous about the safety of Washington that they hampered Hooker; actually, their principal worry at this time must have been Hooker's psychological fitness as an army commander. The United States could not afford another Chancellorsville--especially one fought on Northern soil. They had given Hooker all available reinforcements, including a large part of the Washington garrison, yet Hooker was beginning to complain loudly that Lee's army outnumbered his own! Matters came to a climax over Hooker's desire to evacuate the garrison of Maryland Heights. Piqued at Halleck's insistence on leaving them there as a threat to Lee's communications, Hooker asked to be relieved. Lincoln hastily acquiesced. At about 3:00 a.m., 28 June, a special courier from Washington awoke Maj. Gen. George G. Meade and told him that he was the new commander of the Army of the Potomac.

Meanwhile, the Confederate forces had entered Pennsylvania. Their marches had been easy and uneventful. There had been no opposition, except for a handful of Pennsylvania militia, which Early had scattered just west of Gettysburg on the 26th during his march to York. Another militia unit had withdrawn hastily across the Susquehanna at Wrightsville, burning the bridge there behind it. The town caught fire, and Brig. Gen. John G. Gordon's men helped to save it from the flames. Lee was feeding and supplying his troops off the countryside, taking what he needed by forced purchase (with Confederate money) or formal requisitions on local authorities. Early demanded \$100,000 in United States currency from the town of York, but compromised for the \$28,000 immediately available. Ewell, especially, was collecting food; but he was authorized to take Harrisburg, if he could. Under such favorable conditions, Confederate morale and discipline were excellent.

But, below the Potomac, "Jeb" Stuart was brewing trouble for Lee. On the 23rd, when Lee's army was safely across the Potomac, Stuart had received his orders. They were so

vague and allowed such latitude that he could interpret them to suit himself. Stuart still smarted under the thorough lashing he had received from the Southern press for having been taken by surprise by Pleasonton at Brandy Station, and his ego had been severely irritated. He now planned a campaign of his own to restore his reputation. Detaching the commands of Brig. Gens. Beverly H. Robertson and William E. Jones to guard the gaps of the Blue Ridge Mountains, he took his three favorite brigades and rode east. Almost immediately, Stuart found himself entangled among Union columns that had not yet crossed the Potomac, and in a countryside that was stripped bare of forage for his hard-worked horses. Not until late on the 27th could he find a ford across the Potomac. The next day, he resumed his march, heading for Hanover. During the day, he captured a 125-wagon Federal supply train, which he took with him.


Meanwhile, Lee had no information concerning the Army of the Potomac; he proceeded, therefore, under the very optimistic assumption that it was still sitting south of the Potomac. Now, late in the evening of the 28th, Longstreet's personal spy reached Chambersburg from Washington, and made his report: the Army of the Potomac was around Frederick, and General Meade was in command. The spy's news was actually out of date; the Union army not only was at Frederick, but was preparing to march. At 4:00 a.m., 29 June, Meade began moving north in the announced hope of catching Lee's army at a disadvantage.

Maj. Gen. George Gordon Meade was a cautious, canny fighter, nervous and irritable. The responsibility suddenly dropped upon him was crushing; he knew little about the over-all situation, since Hooker had been as secretive with his subordinates as the late Stonewall Jackson had been with his. Also, Meade was facing Lee--the champion who had been the ruin of McClellan, Pope, Burnside, and Hooker--while Stuart was loose somewhere in his rear.

His major advantages were the support of a seasoned group of corps commanders and an excellent knowledge of Lee's position and actual strength. Halleck gave him no instructions except that he was to "maneuver and fight in such a manner as to cover the capital, and also Baltimore, as far as circumstances will admit." All Federal troops in the area of operations were placed under his command.

The night of 28-29 June had been a busy one for Lee's staff; orders went out on the gallop for all Confederate units to concentrate at Cashtown. Lee's exact plan is unknown--probably he had not yet formulated one--but **Cashtown** offered a strong defensive position, and a Confederate concentration there would be on the flank of any Union advance from Frederick. In all this, it must be remembered that Lee was operating blindly. Stuart, "The Eyes of the Army," was struggling northward toward Hanover, fighting a few petty skirmishes and doing minor damage to the railroads he crossed. Even so, there was still plenty of cavalry with the Army of Northern Virginia, but Lee seems to have forgotten it. Jenkin's activities are obscure; Imboden was still collecting livestock; below the Potomac, Jones and Robertson were left watching the empty landscape west of the Blue Ridge Mountains until 29 June, when Lee suddenly remembered them and ordered them forward.

Meade's earlier determination to find and fight Lee was weakening. He suffered under his new responsibility--losing sleep, missing meals, and frequently changing his mind. On the 30th, while his engineers reconnoitered a defensive position along Big Pipe Creek (**MAP 2**), he ordered Reynolds to advance the next day with the I, XI, and **III** Corps--the first two



MAP 2
GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN

MEADE'S DEFENSIVE POSITION ALONG PIPE CREEK, 30 JUNE 1863

The order assigning Meade to command of the Army of the Potomac also reminded him that, though he was free to act as he saw proper, a primary mission of his army was to defend Washington and Baltimore. After reviewing reports of Confederate movements from Chambersburg, Gettysburg and Carlisle, Meade had a defensive line prepared along Pipe Creek from Manchester to Middleburg (shown on the map as a heavy broken line). While Meade remained at Taneytown the main army moved northward in search of the enemy. By 30 June the various Union corps had reached the positions shown.

corps to Gettysburg, and the III Corps to **Emmitsburg**. At the same time, he left the VI Corps far to the rear at Manchester.

Also on the 30th, Buford, with two brigades of cavalry, rode through Gettysburg toward the Cashtown gap. West of the town, his leading riders clashed briefly with the brigade of Brig. Gen. James J. Pettigrew, which was enroute from Cashtown to Gettysburg in search of a supply of shoes reported there. Lacking cavalry to scout the Union force confronting him, Pettigrew fell back to Cashtown and reported its presence to his division commander, Maj. Gen. Harry Heth, and his corps commander, A. P. Hill. Both men were certain that all the Federal infantry was still far to the south; Heth secured permission to take his division to Gettysburg the next morning and "get those shoes."


Buford examined the terrain and road net around Gettysburg and concluded that this was a key point. Pushing out patrols to the north and west, he reported the situation to Meade and Reynolds, and prepared to hold the town.

This same day, Stuart's tired command came into Hanover and collided with Kilpatrick in a mutually unsatisfactory engagement. Therefore, learning from captured newspapers that Early had been in York on the 28th, Stuart made a strenuous night march toward that town, his men sleeping in their saddles. But he took those 125 wagons. The terrain around Gettysburg shaped the course of the coming battle; it therefore is worth examining.

Northwest of Gettysburg is the dominating height of Oak Hill. **(MAP 3)** From Oak Hill, two high ridges run generally south: Seminary Ridge, the longer one, extends to the Peach Orchard and along the Emmitsburg Road beyond; just to the west is McPherson's Ridge (not labeled), wider but lower. North of Gettysburg, the ground is relatively open and level; south of the town, Cemetery Hill rises abruptly some eighty feet. A lower ridge runs eastward from Cemetery Hill, ending in the rugged, wooded mass of Culp's Hill, while Cemetery Ridge extends for approximately a mile to the south. At its southern tip, Cemetery Ridge dwindles into a low, timbered area, after which come the bold elevations of Little Round Top and Round Top. From Round Top to Culp's Hill, along this "fish hook" line, is approximately four miles. Seminary Ridge and Cemetery Ridge run parallel, about a mile apart, across open fields, but the ground between Seminary Ridge and the Round Tops is rough and broken.

Heth's division, followed by that of Maj. Gen. W. Dorsey Pender, left Cashtown at 5:00 a.m., 1 July; about 8:00 a.m., they encountered Buford's outposts. Buford was ready. One of his brigades were deployed, dismounted, along McPherson's Ridge; the other was across the Carlisle Road, considerably north of Gettysburg, awaiting Ewell. His troopers were badly outnumbered, but their position was good, and their breech-loading carbines gave them the firepower of several times their number of infantry. For almost two hours, this single brigade and one battery of artillery stopped Heth's advance. By 10:30 a.m., Reynolds was on the field, the divisions of his I Corps (temporarily under Doubleday) strung out along the road behind him. Buford's line had been pushed back to Seminary Ridge, and his brigade on the Carlisle Road was reporting pressure from Ewell at Heidlersburg. Reynolds did not know of Meade's decision to defend at Big Pipe Creek; he was a fighter, and Gettysburg looked like a good place for a battle. He ordered Howard's XI Corps forward.

Around 11:00 a.m., Brig. Gen. James S. Wadsworth's division relieved Buford's



brigade on Seminary Ridge, meeting Heth's attack with a furious counterattack which wrecked the latter's two leading brigades. Reynolds was killed by a sharpshooter; stodgy Maj. Gen. Abner Doubleday took command and organized a line along McPherson's and Seminary Ridges. There was a lull then, while Heth waited for Pender, but Buford reported increased difficulty in delaying Ewell. About noon, Howard arrived and took command (giving his corps to Brig. Gen. Carl Schurz), and promptly called for help from Slocum and Sickles. Recognizing the importance of Cemetery Hill, he dropped one of his divisions there as a reserve and began moving the other two toward Oak Hill on Doubleday's right flank. However, the arrival of Ewell's leading division, under Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes, forced him to form them in line directly north of the town. Anxious to avenge Chancellorsville, the XI Corps smashed Rodes' first attack. But Confederate strength was building up too fast. A. P. Hill renewed his attack from the west; Early arrived from York and outflanked the Union right; Confederate artillery on Oak Hill was enfilading the lines of both corps, despite effective Union counterbattery fire. The Union lines gave, slowly and stubbornly in most places, but more and more rapidly on the right as Early's attack gathered momentum.

On the morning of this same day, Stuart's sleepy command entered Dover (just west of York). Early was gone, and the local citizens were unwilling to furnish information. Stuart reasoned that Ewell should be somewhere in the direction of Harrisburg, if the invasion were going well. Halting only to water his mounts, he took the road to Carlisle.

The XI Corps became disorganized during its retreat through Gettysburg, losing a considerable number of prisoners. The I Corps withdrew in relatively good order, covered on its left by Buford.

A. P. Hill was content to halt on Seminary Ridge, but Ewell's advance flowed into Gettysburg. Howard rallied the remnants of the XI Corps on Cemetery Hill, where Brig. Gen. Adolph von Steinwehr, the commander of the division he had left there, had turned the cemetery on the north end of the hill into a strong point. Both Union corps had suffered losses of over 50 per cent, but most of their artillery had fought its way clear. Cemetery Hill and Cemetery Ridge soon bristled with guns.

Shortly after 4:00 p.m., Hancock arrived on the field, under orders from Meade to take command. Howard was senior to Hancock, and stood stiffly on that seniority, but he cooperated. They rapidly organized the position; Hancock grasped the importance of Culp's Hill and browbeat Doubleday into sending the survivors of the Iron Brigade (of Wadsworth's division) to occupy it. The XII Corps began arriving shortly after 5:00 p.m.; the III Corps, an hour later.

Robert E. Lee had become enmeshed in a trap of his own making. He had invaded the North in the hope of winning a decisive battle, yet he had scattered his infantry across south-central Pennsylvania and had lost control of his cavalry. Now, with his army half concentrated, aggressive subordinates had plunged him into a major battle. He had won a partial success against a weaker enemy, but he did not know where the rest of the Union army might be. Now, eager to destroy the withdrawing Union forces, he ordered Ewell to take Cemetery Hill "if possible."

Ewell studied the battered condition of his troops, the emplaced artillery on the hill above him, and a false report that a Federal column was advancing down the York Pike, and did not consider it "possible" to take the hill. Johnson arrived at 7:30 p.m. with Ewell's last

division, but by then it was almost dark. Ewell, despite the mutters of his staff and Lee's gentle hints, still would not risk an attack. Later, he received a report that Culp's Hill was unoccupied, and ordered Johnson to seize it. Johnson's patrols found the Iron Brigade in possession and withdrew hurriedly. Ewell needed cavalry badly. Jenkin's whereabouts were obscure; Stuart was at Carlisle, unsuccessfully trying to bluff a newly arrived militia garrison into surrendering.

That night and the next morning, both armies massed around Gettysburg. Lee's numerical superiority grew slimmer. Meade had arrived at midnight and somewhat regretfully decided to fight there.

Lee's plan for 2 July (**MAP 4**) was for Longstreet to get around the Federal left (which Lee mistakenly thought was along the Emmitsburg Road) and attack north. Anderson's division would then join the assault; Ewell would attack when he heard Longstreet's guns. Lee had wanted an early attack, but it was 11:00 a.m. before his orders were issued.


Longstreet did not approve. He had strongly favored taking up a defensive position and letting Meade attack, and he had thought that Lee had accepted his ideas. Now, disgruntled, he advanced over strange ground, trying to avoid detection by the Federal signal station on Little Round Top. Sharpshooters of the III Corps ambushed his advance guard; the Federal line was not forming for the attack. At 3:00 p.m., Longstreet's artillery opened.

There were three flaws in the Federal position: the Round Tops were not occupied; Pleasonton had ordered Buford from the south flank back to Westminster and had forgotten to replace him; and Sickles had moved his corps forward from the ground just north of the Round Tops without permission from Meade. Sickles' new position was on higher ground, but its salient shape permitted Confederate artillery to take it under fire from two directions; also, it was too extensive for his one corps. Hearing Longstreet's artillery, Meade rode to the Union left flank and expressed displeasure over Sickles' new position, with its apex at the Peach Orchard. However, Confederate infantry was advancing, and it was too late to withdraw. Meade had already ordered Sykes to support the left flank; now he began shifting most of the XII Corps to this area. The leading units of the VI Corps were arriving, but these were exhausted from a thirty-four-mile march.

At 4:00 p.m., Longstreet attacked. From the start, it was a jumbled effort. Divisions and brigades went in piecemeal, but with savage enthusiasm. Hood's division rapidly smashed Sickles' left flank, overran the Devil's Den; and went clawing up the west side of Little Round Top. This was the key to the Federal position. Its west and north slopes had recently been cleared, and from its crest artillery could fire straight down the Union line. (Round Top was higher, but so heavily timbered that it offered neither observation nor fields of fire.)

At this desperate moment, Brig. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac, reached Little Round Top and found it held only by a small signal detail. On his own responsibility, he ordered two V Corps brigades and a battery onto its summit. These units got there a few yards ahead of Hood's men and drove them off in furious hand-to-hand fighting.

Sickles' center and right flank held longer, but were eventually driven back. Anderson's division joined the assault, but its advance also was poorly coordinated. One of



its brigades momentarily broke through the Federal center, but was immediately expelled.

Ewell's artillery opened at the sound of Longstreet's guns, but Union batteries soon silenced it. It was almost dark when Ewell's infantry attacked. Johnson occupied some empty entrenchments at the foot of Culp's Hill, but could not carry the hill itself. Attacking the eastern side of Cemetery Hill, two of Early's brigades got to the top. Only their dead stayed there. That night, Meade called a council of war: should the army stay and fight, or should it retire? His corps commanders voted to stay.

Also during the night, Slocum regrouped his XII Corps and prepared to recover his former position around Culp's Hill. Johnson, heavily reinforced, attacked first but, by 11:00 a.m., 3 July, had been driven back to his original position.

Lee's last uncommitted forces were Pickett's division and Stuart's cavalry. Longstreet urged that the Confederates should envelop the Federal left, get across Meade's communications, and so force him to attack them. But a blind combativeness gripped Lee. He could not delay and maneuver, for his army was living off the country and would soon strip it bare; his own communications were highly vulnerable; the enemy was before him. He gave his orders: Longstreet [Pickett, Heth and Pender, see **(MAP 5)**] would penetrate the Federal center, while Stuart, with all the army's cavalry, struck the Union rear.

Longstreet protested, but made the necessary preparations. He had 159 guns massed opposite the Union center; approximately 15,000 infantry under Pickett concentrated for the assault. At 1:00 p.m., the Confederate guns opened; Union artillery answered until about 2:00 p.m., when their firing was stopped to conserve ammunition. Confederate artillerymen concluded that they had silenced the Union cannon. Their own ammunition being almost exhausted, they urged Pickett to advance while they still could support him.


Confederate infantry poured from the woods along Seminary Ridge. Converging Union artillery fire tore gaps in their ranks, but they closed up and came on gallantly. Union infantry came forward against their flanks. Yet, for a moment, the central mass of Confederates stormed into the first Union line. Then the Federals closed in, and the attack of Pickett's men collapsed. Some quit, more ran, and many died.

Behind this fight, Brig. Gen. David M. Gregg intercepted Stuart and drove him back. Hancock, wounded in Pickett's final assault, urged an immediate counterattack by the V and VI Corps. The VI Corps was fresh--it had hardly fired a shot--and Slocum had already offered one or two brigades from the XII Corps.

Meade, however, had contented himself with fighting a purely defensive battle and had made no plans to seize the initiative from Lee. Instead of keeping the VI Corps concentrated for a decisive counterstroke at the critical time, he had scattered it behind his lines to form local reserves. In so doing, he lost his chance to destroy Lee's army.

Lee took the blame for Pickett's repulse: "It's all my fault," he told the throng of fugitives that straggled back to Seminary Ridge, still mercilessly hammered by the Union guns. Aided by Longstreet, he hastily rallied them to meet the counterattack which he expected, but which never came. That night, he pulled his army together and dug in on a line running from Oak Hill to the Peach Orchard.

Both armies were badly mauled. The Federals had lost 23,049 killed, wounded, or missing--approximately one man out of every four. The Confederates reported losses totaling 20,451, but their returns are incomplete; their actual casualties appear to have been nearer



28,000, or one-third of their force.


Undoubtedly, Gettysburg was the lowest point of Lee's generalship. He was careless; his orders were vague; he suggested when he should have commanded; and he sacrificed the pick of his infantry in a foredoomed attempt to win a battle he had already lost. But, on 4 July, he reasserted himself. All day--as he had the year before at Antietam--he held his army in position, defying Meade to attack and so reestablishing something of the old tradition of invincibility. Meanwhile, his long convoy of wounded started to the rear. That night, in a driving rain, the rest of the Army of Northern Virginia followed.

Meade spent the 4th reorganizing. He had already begun to talk about the need for resting and resupplying his army. All through the day, his observation stations reported Confederate trains assembling or moving to the rear, but he remained cautious and passive, planning a reconnaissance in force for the 5th. On the 5th, Lee was gone.

During this campaign, a relatively small Federal force under French had remained in the vicinity of Frederick. On 3 July, French had sent a cavalry raid against Lee's pontoon bridge over the Potomac at Falling Waters; the guard there was surprised, and the bridge destroyed. Constant rains had the river running bankfull. Without a bridge, Lee would be trapped on the north bank.

Meanwhile, Lee's retreat and Meade's slow pursuit went on. The Union cavalry harried the Confederate trains aggressively, but they were outnumbered by Stuart.

Meade now began to exaggerate Confederate strength and to worry that Lee would try to fight another pitched battle. Actually, Lee had arrived at Williamsport on the 7th. He was almost out of ammunition, and straggling and desertion had further thinned his forces to about 35,000. In desperation, he entrenched with his back to the river and began improvising a bridge, tearing down warehouses to build pontoons. On the 12th, Meade, with over 85,000 men, carefully approached this position. Then he called a council of war. The aggressive corps commanders--Reynolds, Hancock, Sickles--were dead or wounded; a majority of the council voted not to attack. Lee got his command across the river during the night of 13-14 July, catching Meade completely unaware. Buford and Kilpatrick detected the last phases of the movement early on the 14th and drove Lee's rear guard into the river, gathering up a considerable number of prisoners. But Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia had escaped.



THE LINE OF DEFENSE AT THE CEMETERY GATE-HOUSE. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

ORDER OF BATTLE UNITED STATES ARMY

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, Commanding

FIRST ARMY CORPS (Maj. Gen. John R. Reynolds)
(Maj. Gen. Abner Doubleday)
(Maj. Gen. John Newton)

First Division (Brig. Gen. James S. Wadsworth)

First Brigade (Brig. Gen. Solomon Meredith)	Second Brigade (Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler)
19th Indiana	7th Indiana
24th Michigan	76th New York
2d Wisconsin	84th New York (14th Militia)
6th Wisconsin	95th New York
7th Wisconsin	147th New York
	56th Pennsylvania

Second Division (Brig. Gen. John C. Robinson)

First Brigade (Brig. Gen. Gabriel R. Paul)	Second Brigade (Brig. Gen. Henry Baxter)
(Col. Samuel H. Leonard)	12th Massachusetts
(Col. Adrian R. Root)	83rd New York (9th Militia)
(Col. Richard Coulter)	97th New York
(Col. Peter Lyle)	11th Pennsylvania
(Col. Richard Coulter)	88th Pennsylvania
16th Maine	90th Pennsylvania
13th Massachusetts	
94th New York	
104th New York	
107th Pennsylvania	

Third Division (Brig. Gen. Thomas A. Rowley)
(Maj. Gen. Abner Doubleday)

First Brigade (Col. Chapman Biddle)	Second Brigade (Col. Roy Stone)
(Brig. Gen. Thomas Rowley)	(Col. Langhorne Wister)
(Col. Chapman Biddle)	(Col. Edmund L. Dana)
Both New York (10th Militia)	143d Pennsylvania
121st Pennsylvania	49th Pennsylvania
142nd Pennsylvania	150th Pennsylvania
151st Pennsylvania	
Third Brigade (Brig. Gen. George J. Stannard)	Artillery Brigade (Col. Charles S. Wainwright)
(Col. Francis Randall)	4th United States, Battery B
13th Vermont	Maine Light, 2d Battery (B)
4th Vermont	Maine Light, 5th Battery (E)
16th Vermont	1st New York Light, Batteries E and
	1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery B

SECOND ARMY CORPS (Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock)
 (Brig. Gen. John Gibbon)
 (Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock)

First Division (Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell)

First Brigade (Col. Edward E. Cross)	Second Brigade (Col. Patrick Kelly)
(Col. H. Boyd McKeen)	28th Massachusetts
5th New Hampshire	63rd New York (two companies)
61st New York	69th New York (two companies)
81st Pennsylvania	88th New York (two companies)
148th Pennsylvania	116th Pennsylvania (four companies)
Third Brigade (Brig. Gen. Samuel K. Zook)	Fourth Brigade (Col. John R. Brooke)
(Lieut. Col. John Fraser)	27th Connecticut (two companies)
52nd New York	2d Delaware
57th New York	64th New York
66th New York	53rd Pennsylvania
140th Pennsylvania	145th Pennsylvania (seven companies)

Second Division (Brig. Gen. John Gibbon)

(Brig. Gen. William Harrow)

(Brig. Gen. John Gibbon)

First Brigade (Brig. Gen. William Harrow)	Second Brigade (Brig. Gen. Alexander S. Webb)
(Col. Francis E. Heath)	69th Pennsylvania
19th Maine	71st Pennsylvania
15th Massachusetts	72d Pennsylvania
1st Minnesota	106th Pennsylvania
2nd Company Minnesota Sharpshooters	
82nd New York (2d Militia)	

Third Brigade (Col. Norman J. Hall)

19th Massachusetts

10th Massachusetts

7th Michigan

42nd New York

59th New York (four companies)

Third Division (Brig. Gen. Alexander Hays)

First Brigade (Col. Samuel S. Carroll)	Second Brigade (Col. Thomas A. Smyth)
14th Indiana	(Lieut. Col. Francis E. Pierce)
4th Ohio	14th Connecticut
8th Ohio	1st Delaware
7th West Virginia	12th New Jersey
	10th New York (battalion)
	108th New York

Third Brigade (Col. George L. Willard)
 (Col. Eliakim Sherrill)
 (Lieut. Col. James M. Bull)
 39th New York (four companies)
11th New York
 125th New York
 126th New York

Artillery Brigade (Capt. John G. Hazard)
1st United States, Battery I
 4th United States, Battery A
1st New York, Battery B and 14th New
 York Battery
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery A
 1st Rhode Island Light, Battery B

THIRD ARMY CORPS (Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles)
 (Maj. Gen. David B. Birney)

First Division (Maj. Gen. David B. Birney)
 (Brig. Gen. J.H. Hobart Ward)

First Brigade (Brig. Gen. Charles K. Graham) (Col. Andrew H. Tippin)	Second Brigade (Brig. Gen. J. H. Hobart Ward) (Col. Hiram Berdan)
57th Pennsylvania	1st United States Sharpshooters
63rd Pennsylvania	2d United States Sharpshooters
68th Pennsylvania	30th Indiana
105th Pennsylvania	3rd Maine
114th Pennsylvania	4th Maine
141st Pennsylvania	86th New York
	124th New York
	99th Pennsylvania

Third Brigade (Col. P. Regis de Trobriand)
 17th Maine
 3d Michigan
 5th Michigan
 40th New York
110th Pennsylvania (six companies)

Second Division (Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys)

First Brigade (Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Carr)	Second Brigade (Col. William R. Brewster)
1st Massachusetts	10th New York
11th Massachusetts	71st New York
16th Massachusetts	72nd New York
12th New Hampshire	73rd New York
nth New Jersey	74th New York
26th Pennsylvania	120th New York

Third Brigade (Col. George C. Burling)	Artillery Brigade (Capt. George E. Randolph)
2d New Hampshire	(Capt. A. Judson Clark)
5th New Jersey	4th United States, Battery K
6th New Jersey	New Jersey Light, 2d Battery
7th New Jersey	1st New York Light, Battery D
8th New Jersey	New York Light, 4th Battery
115th Pennsylvania	1st Rhode Island Light, Battery E

FIFTH ARMY CORPS (Maj. Gen. George Sykes)

First Division (Brig. Gen. James Barnes)

First Brigade (Col. William S. Tilton)	Second Brigade (Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer)
18th Massachusetts	9th Massachusetts
22d Massachusetts	32d Massachusetts
1st Michigan	4th Michigan
118th Pennsylvania	62nd Pennsylvania

Third Brigade (Col. Strong Vincent)

(Col. James C. Rice)

20th Maine
16th Michigan
44th New York
83d Pennsylvania

Second Division (Brig. Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres)

First Brigade (Col. Hannibal Day)	Second Brigade (Col. Sidney Burbank)
3d United States (six companies)	2d United States (six companies)
4th United States (four companies)	7th United States (four companies)
6th United States (five companies)	10th United States (three companies)
12th United States (eight companies)	11th United States (six companies)
14th United States (eight companies)	17th United States (seven companies)

Third Brigade (Brig. Gen. Stephen H. Weed)

(Col. Kenner Garrard)

140th New York
146th New York
1st Pennsylvania
155th Pennsylvania

Third Division (Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford)

First Brigade (Col. William McCandless)	Third Brigade (Col. Joseph W. Fisher)
1st Pennsylvania Reserves	5th Pennsylvania Reserves
2nd Pennsylvania Reserves	9th Pennsylvania Reserves
6th Pennsylvania Reserves	10th Pennsylvania Reserves
13th Pennsylvania Reserves	11th Pennsylvania Reserves
	12th Pennsylvania Reserves

Artillery Brigade (Capt. Augustus P. Martin)

5th United States, Battery D
5th United States, Battery I
Massachusetts Light, 3d Battery (C)
1st New York Light, Battery C
1st Ohio Light, Battery L

SIXTH ARMY CORPS (Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick)

First Division (Brig. Gen. Horatio G. Wright)

First Brigade (Brig. Gen. A. T. A. Torbert)	Second Brigade (Brig. Gen. Joseph J. Bartlett)
1st New Jersey	5th Maine
2d New Jersey	121st New York
3d New Jersey	95th Pennsylvania
15th New Jersey	96th Pennsylvania

Third Brigade (Brig. Gen. David A. Russell)

6th Maine
49th Pennsylvania (four companies)
119th Pennsylvania
5th Wisconsin

Second Division (Brig. Gen. Albion P. Howe)

Second Brigade (Col. Lewis A. Grant)	Third Brigade (Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Neill)
2d Vermont	7th Maine (six companies)
3d Vermont	33rd New York (detachment)
4th Vermont	43rd New York
5th Vermont	49th New York
6th Vermont	77th New York
	61st Pennsylvania

Third Division (Maj. Gen. John Newton)

(Brig. Gen. Frank Wheaton)

First Brigade (Brig. Gen. Alexander Shaler)	Second Brigade (Col. Henry L. Eustis)
65th New York	7th Massachusetts
67th New York	10th Massachusetts
122d New York	37th Massachusetts
23d Pennsylvania	2d Rhode Island
82d Pennsylvania	

Third Brigade (Brig. Gen. Frank Wheaton)
(Col. David J. Nevin)

62d New York
93d Pennsylvania
98th Pennsylvania
139th Pennsylvania

Artillery Brigade (Col. Charles H. Tompkins)

2d United States, Battery D
4th United States, Battery G
5th United States, Battery F
Massachusetts Light, 1st Battery (A)
New York Light, 1st Battery
New York Light, 3rd Battery
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery C
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery G

ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS (Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard)
(Maj. Gen. Cad Schurz)
(Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard)

First Division (Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow)
(Brig. Gen. Adelbert Ames)

First Brigade (Col. Leopold von Gilsa)	Second Brigade (Brig. Gen. Adelbert Ames)
1st New York	17th Connecticut
54th New York	25th Ohio
68th New York	75th Ohio
153d Pennsylvania	107th Ohio

Second Division (Brig. Gen. Adolph von Steinwehr)

First Brigade (Col. Charles R. Coster)	Second Brigade (Col. Orlando Smith)
134th New York	33d Massachusetts
154th New York	136th New York
27th Pennsylvania	55th Ohio
73rd Pennsylvania	73d Ohio

Third Division (Maj. Gen. Cad Schurz)
(Brig. Gen. Alexander Schimmelfennig)
(Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz)

First Brigade (Brig. Gen. Alexander Schimmelfennig) (Col. George von Amsberg)	Second Brigade (Col. W. Krzyzanowski)
82d Illinois	58th New York
45th New York	119th New York
157th New York	82d Ohio
61st Ohio	75th Pennsylvania
74th Pennsylvania	26th Wisconsin

Artillery Brigade (Maj. Thomas W. Osborn)

4th United States, Battery G
1st New York Light, Battery I
New York Light, 13th Battery
1st Ohio Light, Battery I
1st Ohio Light, Battery K

TWELFTH ARMY CORPS (Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum)
(Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams)

First Division (Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams)
(Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Ruger)

First Brigade (Col. Archibald L. McDougall) 5th Connecticut 20th Connecticut 1st Maryland 123d New York 145th New York 46th Pennsylvania	Second Brigade (Brig. Gen. Henry H. Lockwood) 1st Maryland, Potomac Home Brigade 1st Maryland, Eastern Shore 150th New York
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Third Brigade (Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Ruger)
(Col. Silas Colgrove)
 27th Indiana
 2d Massachusetts
 13th New Jersey
 107th New York
 3d Wisconsin

Second Division (Brig. Gen. John W. Geary)

First Brigade (Col. Charles Candy) 5th Ohio 7th Ohio 29th Ohio 66th Ohio 28th Pennsylvania 147th Pennsylvania	Second Brigade (Col. George A. Cobham, Jr.) (Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Kane) (Col. George A. Cobham, Jr.) 29th Pennsylvania 109th Pennsylvania 111th Pennsylvania
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Third Brigade (Brig. Gen. George S. Greene) 60th New York 78th New York 102nd New York 137th New York 149th New York	Artillery Brigade (Lieut. Edward D. Muhlenberg) 4th United States, Battery F 5th United States, Battery K 1st New York Light, Battery M Pennsylvania Light, Battery E
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CAVALRY CORPS (Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton)

First Division (Brig. Gen. John Buford)

First Brigade (Col. William Gamble) 8th Illinois 12th Illinois (four companies) 3d Indiana (six companies) 8th New York	Second Brigade (Col. Thomas C. Devin) 6th New York 9th New York 17th Pennsylvania 3d West Virginia (two companies)
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Reserve Brigade (Brig. Gen. Wesley Merritt)
 1st United States
 2d United States
 5th United States

Second Division (Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg)

First Brigade (Col. John B. McIntosh)	Third Brigade (Col. Irvin Gregg)
1st Maryland	1st Maine
Purnell (Maryland) Legion, Company A	10th New York
1st Massachusetts	4th Pennsylvania
1st New Jersey	16th Pennsylvania
1st Pennsylvania	
3d Pennsylvania	
3d Pennsylvania Artillery, Section Battery H	

Third Division (Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick)

First Brigade (Brig. Gen. Elon J. Farnsworth)	Second Brigade (Brig. Gen. George A. Custer)
(Col. Nathaniel P. Richmond)	
5th New York	1st Michigan
18th Pennsylvania	5th Michigan
1st Vermont	6th Michigan
1st West Virginia	7th Michigan

Horse Artillery

First Brigade (Capt. James M. Robertson)	Second Brigade (Capt. John C. Tidball)
2d United States, Batteries B, L and M	1st United States, Batteries E, K and G
4th United States, Battery E	2d United States, Battery A
9th Michigan Battery	
6th New York Battery	

ARTILLERY RESERVE (Brig. Gen. Robert O. Tyler)

	(Capt. James M. Robertson)
First Regular Brigade (Capt. Dunbar R. Ransom)	First Volunteer Brigade (Lieut. Col. Freeman McGilvery)
1st United States, Battery H	Massachusetts Light, 5th Battery (E)
3rd United States, Batteries F and K	and 10th New York Battery
4th United States, Battery C	Massachusetts Light, 9th Battery
5th United States, Battery C	New York Light, 15th Battery
	Pennsylvania Light, Batteries C and F
Second Volunteer Brigade (Capt. Elijah D. Taft)	Third Volunteer Brigade (Capt. James F. Huntington)
Connecticut Light, 2d Battery	New Hampshire Light, 1st Battery
New York Light, 5th Battery	1st Ohio Light, Battery H
	1st Pennsylvania Light, Batteries F and G
	West Virginia Light, Battery C
Fourth Volunteer Brigade (Capt. Robert H. Fitzhugh)	
Maine Light, 6th Battery (F)	
Maryland Light, Battery A	
New Jersey Light, 1st Battery	
1st New York Light, Battery G	
1st New York Light, Battery K and 11th New York Battery	

ORDER OF BATTLE

CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY

THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA

(General Robert E. Lee)

FIRST ARMY CORPS (Lieut. Gen. James Longstreet)	
McLaws' Division (Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws)	
Kershaw's Brigade (Brig. Gen. J. B. Kershaw)	Semmes' Brigade (Brig. Gen. P. J. Semmes)
2d South Carolina	(Col. Goode Bryan)
3d South Carolina	10th Georgia
7th South Carolina	50th Georgia
8th South Carolina	51st Georgia
15th South Carolina	53rd Georgia
3d South Carolina Battalion	Wofford's Brigade (Brig. Gen. W. T. Wofford)
Barksdale's Brigade (Brig. Gen. William Barksdale)	16th Georgia
(Col. B. G. Humphreys)	18th Georgia
13th Mississippi	4th Georgia
17th Mississippi	Cobb's (Georgia) Legion
18th Mississippi	Philips (Georgia) Legion
21st Mississippi	

Artillery (Col. H. C. Cabell)

1st North Carolina Artillery, Battery A

Pulaski (Georgia) Artillery

1st Richmond Howitzers

Troup (Georgia) Artillery

Pickett's Division (Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett)	
Garnett's Brigade (Brig. Gen. R. B. Garnett)	Kemper's Brigade (Brig. Gen. J. L. Kemper)
(Maj. C. S. Peyton)	(Col. Joseph Mayo, Jr.)
8th Virginia	1st Virginia
18th Virginia	3d Virginia
19th Virginia	7th Virginia
28th Virginia	nth Virginia
56th Virginia	4th Virginia
Armistead's Brigade (Brig. Gen. L. A. Armistead)	Artillery (Maj. James Dearing)
(Cot. W. R. Aylett)	Fauquier (Virginia) Battery
9th Virginia	Hampden (Virginia) Battery
14th Virginia	Richmond Fayette Artillery
38th Virginia	Virginia Battery
53d Virginia	
57th Virginia	

Hood's Division (Maj. Gen. John B. Hood)

(Brig. Gen. E. M. Law)

Law's Brigade (Brig. Gen. E. M. Law)
(Col. James L. Sheffield)

4th Alabama
15th Alabama
44th Alabama
47th Alabama
48th Alabama

Robertson's Brigade (Brig. Gen. J. B. Robertson)

3d Arkansas
1st Texas
4th
5th Texas

Anderson's Brigade (Brig. Gen. George T. Anderson)

(Lieut. Col. William Luffman)

7th Georgia
8th Georgia
9th Georgia
11th Georgia
59th Georgia

Benning's Brigade (Brig. Gen. Henry L. Benning)

2d Georgia
15th Georgia
17th Georgia
20th Georgia

Artillery (Maj. M. W. Henry)

Branch (North Carolina) Artillery

German (South Carolina) Artillery

Palmetto (South Carolina) Light Artillery

Rowan (North Carolina) Artillery

Artillery Reserve (Col. J. B. Walton)

Alexander's Battalion (Col. E. P. Alexander) Washington (Louisiana) Artillery (Major

Ashland (Virginia) Artillery

B. F. Eshleman)

Bedford (Virginia) Artillery

First Company

Brooks (South Carolina) Artillery

Second Company

Madison (Louisiana) Light Artillery

Third Company

Virginia Battery

Fourth Company

Virginia Battery

SECOND ARMY CORPS (Lieut. Gen. Richard S. Ewell)

Early's Division (Maj. Gen. **Jubal** A. Early)

Hays' Brigade (Brig. Gen. Harry T. Hays)

Smith's Brigade (Brig. Gen. William Smith)

5th Louisiana

31st Virginia

6th Louisiana

49th Virginia

7th Louisiana

52d Virginia

8th Louisiana

9th Louisiana

Hoke's Brigade (Col. Isaac E. Avery)

Gordon's Brigade (Brig. Gen. J. B. Gordon)

(Col. A. C. Goodwin)

6th North Carolina

13th Georgia

21st North Carolina

26th Georgia

57th North Carolina

31st Georgia

38th Georgia

both Georgia

61st Georgia

Artillery (Lieut. Col. H. P. Jones)
 Charlottesville (Virginia) Artillery
 Courtney (Virginia) Artillery
 Louisiana Guard Artillery
 Staunton (Virginia) Artillery

Johnson's Division (Maj. Gen. Edward Johnson)

Steuart's Brigade (Brig. Gen. George H Steuart)	Nicholl's Brigade (Col. J. M. Williams)
1st Maryland Battalion Infantry	1st Louisiana
1st North Carolina	2d Louisiana
3d North Carolina	10th Louisiana
10th Virginia	14th Louisiana
23d Virginia	15th Louisiana
37th Virginia	
Stonewall's Brigade (Brig. Gen. James A. Walker)	Jones's Brigade (Brig. Gen. John M. Jones)
2d Virginia	(Lieut. Col. R. H. Duncan)
4th Virginia	21st Virginia
5th Virginia	25th Virginia
27th Virginia	42d Virginia
33d Virginia	44th Virginia
	48th Virginia
	50th Virginia

Artillery (Maj. J. W. Latimer)
 (Capt. C. I. Raine)
 1st Maryland Battery
 Alleghany (Virginia) Battery
 Chesapeake (Maryland) Artillery
 Lee (Virginia) Battery

Rodes's Division (Maj. Gen. R. E. Rodes)

Daniel's Brigade (Brig. Gen. Junius Daniel)	Iverson's Brigade (Brig. Gen. Alfred Iverson)
32d North Carolina	5th North Carolina
43d North Carolina	12th North Carolina
45th North Carolina	10th North Carolina
53d North Carolina	23d North Carolina
2d North Carolina Battalion	Ramseur's Brigade (Brig. Gen. S. D. Ramseur)
Doles's Brigade (Brig. Gen. George Doles)	2d North Carolina
4th Georgia	4th North Carolina
12th Georgia	14th North Carolina
21st Georgia	30th North Carolina
44th Georgia	

O'Neal's Brigade (Brig. Gen. E. A. O'Neal)	Artillery (Lieut. Col. Thomas H. Carter)
3d Alabama	Jeff. Davis (Alabama) Artillery
5th Alabama	King William (Virginia) Artillery
6th Alabama	Morris (Virginia) Artillery
12th Alabama	Orange (Virginia) Artillery
26th Alabama	

Artillery Reserve (Col. J. Thompson Brown)

First Virginia Artillery (Captain Willis J. Dance)	Nelson's Battalion (Lieut. Col. William Nelson)
2d Richmond (Virginia) Howitzers	Amherst (Virginia) Artillery
3d Richmond (Virginia) Howitzers	Fluvanna (Virginia) Artillery
Powhatan (Virginia) Artillery	Georgia Battery
Rockbridge (Virginia) Artillery	
Salem (Virginia) Artillery	

THIRD ARMY CORPS (Lieut. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill)

Anderson's Division (Maj. Gen. R. H. Anderson)

Wilcox's Brigade (Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox)	Wright's Brigade (Brig. Gen. A. R. Wright)
8th Alabama	(Col. William Gibson)
9th Alabama	(Brig. Gen. A. R. Wright)
10th Alabama	3d Georgia
11th Alabama	22d Georgia
14th Alabama	48th Georgia
	2d Georgia Battalion
Mahone's Brigade (Brig. Gen. William Mahone)	Perry's Brigade (Col. David Lang)
6th Virginia	2d Florida
12th Virginia	5th Florida
16th Virginia	8th Florida
41st Virginia	
Gist Virginia	

Posey's Brigade (Brig. Gen. Carnot Posey)	Artillery (Sumter Battalion) (Maj. John Lane)
12th Mississippi	Company A
16th Mississippi	Company B
19th Mississippi	Company C
48th Mississippi	

Heth's Division (Maj. Gen. Henry Heth)

(Brig. Gen. J. J. Pettigrew)

First Brigade (Brig. Gen. J. J. Pettigrew)	Second Brigade (Col. J. M. Brockenbrough)
(Col. J. K. Marshall)	40th Virginia
1st North Carolina	47th Virginia
26th North Carolina	55th Virginia
47th North Carolina	22d Virginia Battalion
52d North Carolina	

Third Brigade (Brig. Gen. James J. Archer)	Fourth Brigade (Brig. Gen. Joseph R. Davis)
(Col. B. D. Fry)	2d Mississippi
(Lieut. Col. S. G. Shepard)	11th Mississippi
13th Alabama	42d Mississippi
5th Alabama Battalion	55th North Carolina
1st Tennessee (Provisional Army)	
7th Tennessee	
4th Tennessee	

Artillery (Lieut. Col. John J. Garnett)
 Donaldsonville (Louisiana) Artillery
 Huger (Virginia) Artillery
 Lewis (Virginia) Artillery
 Norfolk Light Artillery Blues

Pender's Division (Maj. Gen. William D. Pender)
 (Brig. Gen. James H. Lane)
 (Maj. Gen. William D. Pender)
 (Brig. Gen. James H. Lane)

First Brigade (Col. Abner Perrin)	Second Brigade (Brig. General James H. Lane)
1st South Carolina (Provisional Army)	(Col. C. M. Avery)
1st South Carolina Rifles	(Brig. Gen. James H. Lane)
12th South Carolina	(Col. C. M. Avery)
13th South Carolina	
4th South Carolina	7th North Carolina

18th North Carolina
 28th North Carolina
 33d North Carolina
 37th North Carolina

Third Brigade (Brig. Gen. Edward L. Thomas)
 4th Georgia
 35th Georgia
 45th Georgia
 49th Georgia

Fourth Brigade (Brig. Gen. A. M. Scales)
 (Lieut. Col. G. T. Gordon)
 (Col. W. Lee J. Lowrance)
 13th North Carolina
 16th North Carolina
 22d North Carolina
 34th North Carolina
 38th North Carolina

Artillery (Maj. William T. Poague)
 Albemarle (Virginia) Artillery
 Charlotte (North Carolina) Artillery
 Madison (Mississippi) Light Artillery
 Virginia Battery

Artillery Reserve (Col. R. Lindsay Walker)	
MacIntosh's Battalion (Maj. D. G. McIntosh)	Pegram's Battalion (Maj. W. J. Pegram)
Danville (Virginia) Artillery	(Capt. E. B. Brunson)
Hardaway (Alabama) Artillery	Crenshaw (Virginia) Battery
2d Rockbridge (Virginia) Artillery	Fredericksburg (Virginia) Artillery
Virginia Battery	Letcher (Virginia) Artillery
	Pee D (South Carolina) Artillery
	Purcell (Virginia) Artillery

CAVALRY

Stuart's Division (Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart)	
Hampton's Brigade (Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton)	Robertson's Brigade (Brig. Gen. Beverly H. Robertson)
(Col. L. S. Baker)	4th North Carolina
1st North Carolina	5th North Carolina
1st South Carolina	
2d South Carolina	
Cobb's (Georgia) Legion	
Jeff. Davis. Legion	
Phillips (Georgia) Legion	
Jones's Brigade (Brig. Gen. William E. Jones)	Fitz. Lee's Brigade (Brig. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee)
6th Virginia	1st Maryland Battalion
7th Virginia	1st Virginia
nth Virginia	2d Virginia
	3d Virginia
	4th Virginia
	5th Virginia
Jenkins' Brigade (Brig. Gen. A. G. Jenkins)	W. H. F. Lee's Brigade (Col. J. R. Chambliss, Jr.)
(Col. M. J. Ferguson)	2d North Carolina
14th Virginia	9th Virginia
16th Virginia	10th Virginia
17th Virginia	13th Virginia
34th Virginia Battalion	
36th Virginia Battalion	
Jackson's (Virginia) Battery	
Stuart Horse Artillery (Maj. R. F. Beckham)	
Breathed's (Virginia) Battery	
Chew's (Virginia) Battery	
Griffin's (Maryland) Battery	
Hart's (South Carolina) Battery	
McGregor's (Virginia) Battery	
Moorman's (Virginia) Battery	

Imboden's Command (Brig. Gen. J. D. Imboden)	
18th Virginia Cavalry	Virginia Partisan Rangers
62d Virginia Infantry, Mounted	Virginia Battery

CASUALTIES

Estimates of numbers engaged in Civil War battles vary, and statistics on killed, wounded, captured and missing are incomplete. Participants attempted to fill gaps as they wrote their official reports, and historians have tried to refine the data. The tabulation below is drawn from the Official Record, and from Thomas L. Livermore, Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America, 1861-1865 (New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1901).

Battle of Gettysburg 1-3 July 1863

Army of the Potomac:
(Strength - 95,170*)

	Killed	Captured/ Wounded	Missing	Aggregate
General Headquarters		4		4
I Corps	666	3,231	2,162	6,059
II Corps	797	3,194	378	4,369
III Corps	593	3,029	589	4,211
V Corps	365	1,611	211	2,187
VI Corps	27	185	30	242
XI Corps	369	1,922	1,510	3,801
XII Corps	204	812	66	1,082
Cavalry Corps	91	354	407	852
Artillery Reserve	43	187	12	242
Total	3,155	14,529	5,365	23,049

Army of Northern Virginia:
(Strength - 65,510*)

	Killed	Captured/ Wounded	Missing	Aggregate
I Corps	910	4,339	2,290	7,539
II Corps	809	4,823	1,305	5,937
III Corps	837	4,407	1,491	6,735
Stuart's Cavalry Div	36	140	64	240
Total	2,592	13,709	5,150	20,451

*As of 31 May 1863

ORGANIZATION

The infantry regiment was the basic administrative and tactical unit of the Civil War armies. Regimental headquarters consisted of a colonel, lieutenant colonel, major, adjutant, quartermaster, surgeon (with rank of major), two assistant surgeons, a chaplain, sergeant major, quartermaster sergeant, commissary sergeant, hospital steward, and two principal musicians. Each company was staffed by a captain, a first lieutenant, a second lieutenant, a first sergeant, four sergeants, eight corporals, two musicians, and one wagoner.

The authorized strength of a Civil War infantry regiment was about 1,000 officers and men, arranged in ten companies plus a headquarters and (for the first half of the war at least) a band. Discharges for physical disability, disease, special assignments (bakers, hospital nurses, or wagoners), court martials, and battle injuries all combined to reduce effective combat strength. Before too long a typical regiment might be reduced to less than 500 troops.

Brigades were made up of two or more regiments, with four regiments being most common. Union brigades averaged 1,000 to 1,500 infantry, while a Confederate brigade averaged 1,500 to 1,800. Union brigades were designated by a number within their division, and each Confederate brigade was designated by the name of a current or former commander.


Divisions were formed of two or more brigades. Union divisions contained 2,500 to 4,000 infantry, while the Confederate infantry division was somewhat larger, containing 5,000 to 6,000 men. Union divisions were designated by a number within their corps, and Confederate divisions took the name of a current or former commander.

Corps were formed of two or more divisions. Two or more corps usually constituted an army, the largest operational organization. In the Eastern Theater the two principal adversaries were the Union Army of the Potomac and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia. During the Gettysburg campaign the Army of the Potomac was organized into seven infantry and one cavalry corps. As of 31 May 1863 the strength of the Army of the Potomac was about 95,000.

On 31 May 1863, the Army of Northern Virginia consisted of three infantry corps and a cavalry division, totalling about 65,000 men.

During the Gettysburg campaign Union artillery was organized into brigades of about five batteries each, with each corps having one brigade. The artillery reserve consisted of four brigades and could be assigned as needed. Confederate artillery was organized into brigades of about four batteries, each brigade assigned to a division. An artillery reserve of about nine batteries was assigned to each corps.

CHART OF CIVIL WAR ARMY ORGANIZATION



LOGISTICS

BUREAU SYSTEM. Bureau chiefs and heads of staff departments were responsible for various aspects of the Army's administration and logistics and reported directly to the Secretary of War. The division of responsibility and authority over them among the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretaries, and the General in Chief was never spelled out, and the supply departments functioned independently and without effective coordination throughout most of the Civil War, although much improved after Grant took command.

Logistical support was entrusted to the heads of four supply departments in Washington: the Quartermaster General, responsible for clothing and equipment, forage, animals, transportation, and housing; the Commissary General for rations; the Chief of Ordnance for weapons, ammunition, and miscellaneous related equipment; and the Surgeon General for medical supplies, evacuation, treatment, and hospitalization of the wounded.

For other support there were the Adjutant General, the Inspector General, the Paymaster General, the Judge Advocate General, the Chief of Engineers, and the Chief of Topographical Engineers.

The military department was the basic organizational unit for administrative and logistical purposes, and the commander of each department controlled the support in that area with no intervening level between his departmental headquarters and the bureau chiefs in Washington. There were six departments when the war started (East, West, Texas, New Mexico, Utah, and Pacific); however, later on, boundaries changed and several geographical departments might be grouped together as a military "division" headquarters.

Army depots were located in major cities: Boston, New York, Baltimore, Washington, Cincinnati, Louisville, St. Louis, Chicago, New Orleans, and San Francisco. Philadelphia was the chief depot and manufacturing center for clothing. Advanced and temporary supply bases were established as needed to support active operations. Until 1864 most depots were authorized the rank of captain as commander, who despite their low rank and meager pay, had tremendous resources of men, money, and material under their control. There were a few exceptions, notably COL Daniel H. Rucker at the Washington QM Depot and COL George D. Ramsay at the Washington Arsenal. The primary function of the depots was to procure supplies and prepare them for use in the field by repacking, assembling, or other similar tasks.

Procurement was decentralized. Purchases were made on the market by low-bid contract in the major cities and producing areas by depot officers. Flour and some other commodities were procured closer to the troops when possible. Cattle were contracted for at specific points, and major beef depots were maintained at Washington (on the grounds of the unfinished Washington Monument), Alexandria, VA, and Louisville, KY. The Subsistence Department developed a highly effective system of moving cattle on the hoof to the immediate rear of the armies in the field, to be slaughtered by brigade butchers and issued to the troops the day before consumption.

The Confederate Army used a similar system with depots at Richmond, Staunton, Raleigh, Atlanta, Columbus (GA), Huntsville, Montgomery, Jackson (MS), Little Rock, Alexandria (LA), and San Antonio.

SUPPLY OPERATIONS. Most unit logistics were accomplished at regimental level. The regimental QM was normally a line lieutenant designated by the regimental commander. His duties included submitting requisitions for all QM supplies and transport, accounting for regimental property including tentage, camp equipment, extra clothing, wagons, forage, and animals; issuing supplies and managing the regimental trains. The regimental commissary officer, also designated from the line, requisitioned, accounted for, and issued rations. The regimental ordnance officer had similar duties regarding arms and ammunition and managed the movement of the unit ammunition train.

In theory, logistical staff positions above the regiment were filled by a fully qualified officer of the supply department concerned. However, experienced officers were in perpetual short supply, and many authorized positions were filled by officers and noncommissioned officers from line units or left vacant, the duties performed by someone in addition to their own. This problem existed in both armies, where inexperience and ignorance of logistical principles and procedures generally reduced levels of support.

The Soldier's Load: About 45 lbs. (Union) - Musket and bayonet (14 lbs.), 60 rounds, 3-8 days rations, canteen, blanket or overcoat, shelter half, ground sheet, mess gear (cup, knife, fork, spoon, skillet), personal items (sewing kit, razor, letters, Bible, etc.). Confederates usually had less, about 30 lbs.

Official US Ration: 20 oz. of fresh or salt beef or 12 oz. of pork or bacon, 18 oz. of flour or 20 of corn meal (bread in lieu if possible), 1.6 oz. of rice or .64 oz. of beans or 1.5 oz of dried potatoes, 1.6 oz of coffee or .24 oz. of tea, 2.4 oz. of sugar, .54 oz. of salt, .32 gill of vinegar.

Union Marching Ration: 16 oz. of "hardtack," 12 oz. salt pork or 4 oz. fresh meat, 1 oz. coffee, 3 oz. sugar, and salt.

Confederate Ration: Basically the same but with slightly more sugar and less meat, coffee, vinegar and salt, and seldom issued in full. For the Army of Northern Virginia usually half of meat issued and coffee available only when captured or exchanged through the lines for sugar and tobacco. During the Maryland campaign foraging was disappointing, so Confederate soldiers supplemented the issue ration with corn from the fields and fruit from the orchards.

Forage: Each horse required 14 lbs. of hay and 12 of grain per day; mules needed the same amount of hay and 9 lbs of grain. No other item was so bulky and difficult to transport.

Union Annual Clothing Issue: 2 caps, 1 hat, 2 dress coats, 3 pr. trousers, 3 flannel shirts, 3 flannel drawers, 4 pr. stockings and 4 pr. bootees (high top shoes). Artillerymen and cavalrymen were issued jackets and boots instead of bootees. Allowance = \$42.

Confederate: Officially, the Confederate soldier was almost equally well clothed, but the QM was seldom able to supply the required items and soldiers wore whatever came to hand,

the home-dyed butternut jackets and trousers being characteristic items. Shortages of shoes were a constant problem.

Tents: Sibley (tepee) held 20 men feet to center pole; early in war Union introduced the tente de'Abri (shelter half), used by the French Army, and called "dog" tent by witty soldiers, now pup tent.

Baggage: Enlisted men of both armies were required to carry their own. Union order of Sep 1862 limited officers to blankets, one small valise or carpet bag and an ordinary mess kit. Confederate standards allowed generals 80 lbs., field officers 65 lbs., and captains and subalterns 50 lbs.

Wagons: Union's standard 6-mule Army wagon could haul 4,000 lbs on good roads in the best of conditions but seldom exceeded 2,000 or with 4 mules 1,800 lbs. at rate of 12-24 miles a day. Confederates often used 4-mule wagon with smaller capacity.

Army of the Potomac authorized wagons as follows:

corps hq	4
div and bde hq	3
regt of Inf	6
arty bty and cav	3

One wagon per regiment was reserved for hospital stores and one for grain for officers' horses.

The Army of Northern Virginia used 4-mule wagons as follows:

div hq	3
bde hq	2
regt hq	1
regt's medical stores	1
regt's ammunition	1
1/100 men per regt for baggage, camp equipment, rations, etc.	

Numbers of supply wagons per 1,000 men:

Army of the Potomac (1862)	29
Jackson in the Valley (1862)	7
Army of Northern Virginia (1863)	28
Army of the Potomac (1864)	36
Sherman's March to the Sea (1864)	40
Napoleon's standard	12.5

SMALL ARMS

In 1855 the U. S. Army adopted a .58 caliber rifled-musket to replace a .69 caliber smooth-bore musket. The new infantry arm was muzzle-loaded, its rifled barrel taking a hollow-based cylindro-conical bullet slightly smaller than the bore. Loading procedure required the soldier to withdraw a paper cartridge (containing powder and bullet) from his cartridge box, tear open one end with his teeth, pour the powder into the muzzle, place the bullet in the muzzle and ram it to the breech using a metal ramrod. A copper percussion cap was then placed on a hollow cone at the breech. To fire the weapon the hammer was cocked, and when the trigger was pulled the hammer struck the cap and ignited the powder charge. Each soldier was expected to be capable of loading and firing three aimed shots per minute. Although the maximum range of a rifled-musket might be over 1,000 yards actual fields of fire were often very short, the emphasis of musketry fire resting upon volume at close range rather than accuracy at long.

The basic ammunition load for each infantry soldier was 40 rounds in the cartridge box. When a large action was expected 20 additional rounds were issued to each soldier, who placed them in his uniform pockets or knapsack. In addition, 100 rounds per man were held in the brigade or division trains and 100 rounds in the corps trains.

At the beginning of the war a shortage of rifled-muskets on both sides forced the Northern and Southern governments to issue the older smooth-bore weapons, or purchase weapons from European nations. As the war progressed most soldiers eventually were armed with rifled-muskets, although even late in the war some troops on both sides still carried smooth-bores.

Before and during the war there were dozens of breech-loading rifles and carbines, both single and multiple-shot. Several types were purchased by the Government but were not issued in any numbers because of complicated construction, mechanical problems and cost. Three breech-loading rifles used by infantry were the .52 caliber, single-shot Sharps, .52 caliber, seven-shot Spencer, and .44 caliber fifteen-shot Henry. While the Sharps used a linen cartridge, the Spencer and Henry weapons used metallic, rimfire cartridges.

Handguns, both single and multiple shot, generally were generally carried by officers and possibly artillerymen. Although the types of handguns used by both sides were innumerable, two of the most common were six-shot revolvers produced by Colt and Remington, both in .36 and .44 caliber.

Union cavalry were initially armed with sabers and handguns, but soon added breech-loading carbines. In addition to Sharps and Spencer carbines, dozens of other types of breech-loaders, from .52 to .56 caliber, were issued. Confederate cavalrymen might be armed with a wide variety of handguns, shotguns, muzzle-loading carbines or captured Federal weapons.

TYPICAL CIVIL WAR SMALL ARMS

WEAPON	EFF. RANGE	RATE OF FIRE
U.S. rifled-musket, muzzle-loaded, cal .58	200-500 yds	3 rds/min
English Enfield rifled-musket, muzzle-loaded, cal .577	200-500 yds	3 rds/min
Smooth-bore musket, muzzle-loaded, cal .69	50-80 yds	3 rds/min
Henry rifle, fifteen-shot magazine, breech-loaded, cal .44	200-500 yds	16 rds/ 11 sec
Spencer carbine, seven-round magazine, breech-loaded, cal .52	150-200 yds	8 rds/20 sec
Sharps carbine, single-shot, breech-loaded, cal .52	150-200 yds	9 rds/min
Burnside carbine, single-shot, breech-loaded, cal .54	150-200 yds	9 rds/min
Revolvers, six-shot, cal .44	20-50 yds	


ARTILLERY

Civil War field artillery was organized into batteries of four or six guns. Regulations prescribed a captain as battery commander, while lieutenants commanded two-gun "sections." Each gun made up a platoon, under a sergeant ("chief of the piece") with 8 crewmen and six drivers.

During transportation each gun was attached to a limber, drawn by a six-horse team. The limber chest carried thirty to fifty rounds of ammunition, depending on the type of guns in the battery. In addition to the limbers, each gun had at least one caisson, also drawn by a six-horse team. The caisson carried additional ammunition in its two chests, as well as a spare wheel and tools. A horse-drawn forge and a battery wagon with tools accompanied each battery. A battery at full regulation strength, including all officers, noncoms, buglers, horse holders and other specialized functions, might exceed 100 officers and men. With spare horses included, a typical six-gun battery might have about 100-150 horses.

A battery could unlimber and fire an initial volley in about one minute, and each gun could continue firing two aimed shots a minute. The battery could limber up in about three minutes. Firing was by "direct fire," that is fire in which the target is in view of the gun. The prescribed distance between guns was fourteen yards from hub to hub. Therefore, a six-gun battery would represent a normal front of a little over 100 yards. Depth of the battery position, from the gun muzzle, passing the limber, to the rear of the caisson, was prescribed as 47 yards. In practice these measurements might be altered by terrain.

During firing **cannoneers** took their positions as in the diagram below. At the command "Commence firing," the gunner ordered "Load." While the gunner sighted the piece, Number 1 sponged the bore, Number 5 received a round from Number 7 at the limber and carried the round to Number 2, who placed it in the bore. Number 1 rammed the round to the breech while Number 3 "thumbed the vent." When the gun was loaded and sighted, Number 3 inserted a vent pick in the vent and punctured the cartridge bag. Number 4 attached a lanyard to a friction primer and inserted the primer in the vent. At the command "Fire," Number 4 yanked the lanyard. Number 6 cut fuses (if needed). The process was repeated until the command "Cease firing."



CIVIL WAR FIELD ARTILLERY - STATISTICS

WEAPON	TUBE COMPOSITION	EFF. RANGE
6-Pdr smooth-bore 3.67 in. bore	bronze	1500 yds
12-Pdr smooth-bore (Napoleon) 4.62 in. bore	bronze	1600 yds
10-Pdr rifle (Parrott) 3.00 in. bore*	iron	1800 yds
3-inch rifle (Ordnance) 3.00 in. bore	iron	1800 yds
20-Pdr rifle (Parrott) 3.67 in. bore	iron	1900 yds
12-Pdr rifle (Whitworth)** 2.75 in. bore	iron	2800 yds

Number of field guns at Gettysburg:

Union - 360 (Mostly 10-pounder Parrott and 3-inch Ordnance rifles)

Confederate - 241 (Mostly 12-pounder Napoleons, 10-pounder Parrott and 3-inch Ordnance rifles)

*Caliber of Parrott M1861 is 2.9 in.; M1863 is 3.0 in.

**The Confederate army had only two of these breech-loading rifles, the Union army none.

ARTILLERY PROJECTILES

Four basic types of projectiles were employed by Civil War field artillery:



SHOT



BOLT

SOLID PROJECTILES - Round (spherical) projectiles of solid iron for smooth-bores were commonly called "cannonballs" or just plain "shot." When elongated for rifled weapons the projectile was known as a "bolt." Solid projectiles were used against opposing batteries, wagons, buildings, etc., as well as enemy personnel. While shot could ricochet across open ground against advancing infantry or cavalry, bolts tended to bury themselves upon impact with the ground and therefore were not used a great deal by field artillery.



SPHERICAL SHELL



RIFLED SHELL

SHELL - The shell, whether spherical or conical, was a hollow iron projectile filled with a black powder bursting charge. It was designed to break into several ragged fragments. Spherical shells exploded by fuses set into an opening in the shell, and were ignited by the flame of the cannon's propelling charge. The time of detonation was determined by adjusting the length of the fuse. Conical shells were detonated by similar timed fuses, or by impact. Shells were intended to impact on the target.




SPHERICAL CASE SHOT



RIFLED CASE SHOT

CASE SHOT - Case shot, or "shrapnel" was the invention of Henry Shrapnel, an English artillery officer. The projectile had a thinner wall than a shell and **was filled** with a number of small lead or iron balls (27 for a 12-pounder). A timed fuse ignited a small bursting charge which fragmented the casing and scattered the contents in the air. Case shot was intended to burst from fifty to seventy-five yards short of the target, the fragments being carried forward by the velocity of the shot.



CANISTER

CANISTER - Canister consisted of a tin cylinder in which was packed a number of iron or lead balls. Upon discharge the cylinder split open and the smaller projectiles fanned out. Canister was an extremely effective anti-personnel weapon, with a maximum range of 400 yards. In emergencies double loads of canister could be used at ranges less than 200 yards, using a single propelling charge.

TABLE OF FIRE. LIGHT 12-POUNDER GUN. MODEL 1857.

SHOT. Charge 2; Pounds.		SPHERICAL CASE SHOT. Charge 2; Pounds.			SHELL. Charge 2 Pounds.		
ELEVATION In Degrees.	RANGE In Yards.	ELEVATION In Degrees	TIME OF FLIGHT. Seconds.	RANGE In Yards.	ELEVATION In Degrees.	TIME OF FLIGHT In Seconds.	RANGE In Yards.
0°	323	0°50'	1"	300	0°	0"75	300
1°	620	1°	1"75	575	0°30'	1"25	425
2°	875	1°30'	2"5	635	1°	1"75	615
3°	1200	2°	3"	730	1°30'	2"25	700
4°	1325	3°	4"	96()	2°	2"75	785
5	1680	3°30'	4"75	1080	2°30'	3"5	925
		3 40'	5"	1135	3°	4"	1080
					3°45'	5"	1300

Use SHOT at masses of troops, and to batter, from 600 up to 2,000 yards. Use SHELL for tiring buildings, at troops posted in woods, in pursuit, and to produce an armor rather than a physical effect; greatest effective range 1,500 yards. Use SPHERICAL CASE SHOT at masses of troops, at not less than 500 yards; generally up to 1,500 yards. CANISTER is not effective at 600 yards; it should not be used beyond 500 yards, and but very seldom find over the most favorable ground at that distance; at short ranges. (less than 200 yards,) in emergency. use double canister, with single charge. Do not employ RICOCHET at less distance than 1,000 to 1,100 yards.

CARE OF AMMUNITION CHEST,

1st. Keep everything out that does not belong in them, except a bunch of cord or wire for breakage; beware of loose tacks, nails, bones, or scraps.
2d. Keep friction primers in their papers, tied up. The pouch containing those for instant service must be closed, and so placed as to be secure.
Take every precaution that primers do not get loose; a single one may cause an explosion. Use plenty of tow in packing.

(This sheet is to be glued on to the inside of Limber Chest Cover.)

TABLE OF FIRE

20-PDR. PARROTT GUN

Charge, 2 lbs. of Mortar Powder

ELEVATION In Degrees	PROJECTILE	RANGE In Yards	TIME OF FLIGHT In Seconds
1	Case Shot, 19 1/2 lbs.	620	1 7/8
2	Case Shot, 19 1/2 lbs.	950	3 1/8
3 5/8	Shell, 18 3/4 lbs.	1500	4 3/4
5	Shell, 18 3/4 lbs.	2100	6 1/2
10	Shell, 18 3/4 lbs.	3350	11 1/4
15	Shell, 18 3/4 lbs.	4400	17 1/4

CARE OF AMMUNITION CHEST

1st. Keep everything out that does not belong in them, except a bunch of cord or wire for breakage; beware of loose tacks, nails, bolts, or scraps.
2nd. Keep friction primers in their papers, tied up. The pouch containing those for instant service must be closed, and so placed as to be secure.
Take every precaution that primers do not get loose; a single one may cause an explosion. Use plenty of tow in packing.

(This sheet is to be glued to the inside of Limber Chest Cover.)

Firing tables were glued to the inside of limber ammunition chest lids.

TACTICS

The tactical legacy of the eighteenth century had emphasized close order formations of soldiers trained to maneuver in concert and fire by volleys. These "linear" tactics stressed the tactical offensive. Assault troops advanced in line, two ranks deep, with cadenced steps, stopping to fire volleys on command and finally rushing the last few yards to pierce the enemy line with a bayonet charge.



These tactics were adequate for troops armed with single-shot, muzzle-loading, smooth-bore muskets with an effective range of about eighty yards. The close-order formation was therefore necessary to concentrate the fire power of these inaccurate weapons. Bayonet charges might then succeed because infantry could rush the last eighty yards before the defending infantrymen could reload their muskets after firing a volley.

The U.S. Army's transition from smooth-bore muskets to rifled-muskets in the mid-nineteenth century would have two main effects in the American Civil War: it would strengthen the tactical defensive and increase the number of casualties in the attacking force. With a weapon which could cause casualties out to 1,000 yards defenders firing rifles could decimate infantry formations attacking according to linear tactics.


During the Civil War the widespread use of the rifled-musket caused infantry assault formations to loosen up somewhat, with individual soldiers seeking available cover and concealment. However, because officers needed to maintain visual and verbal control of their commands during the noise, smoke and chaos of combat, close-order tactics to some degree would continue to the end of the war.

A typical combat formation of a regiment might be six companies in the main line, with two in reserve, and two out in front in extended skirmish order. During battle additional companies might be fed into the skirmish line, or the skirmishers might regroup on the main line.

Rapid movement of units on roads or cross country, was generally by formation of a column four men abreast. The speed of such columns was prescribed as 2 miles per hour. Upon reaching the field each regiment was typically formed into a line two ranks deep, the shoulders of each man in each rank touching the shoulders of the man on either side. The distance between ranks was prescribed as thirteen inches. A regiment of 500 men (250 men in each rank), might have a front of about 200 yards. Both front and rear ranks were capable of firing, either by volley or individual fire.



43



Regiment Formed Into Line of Battle

GETTYSBURG WEATHER REPORTS

During the Confederate invasion of Pennsylvania the Rev. Dr. Michael Jacobs of Pennsylvania College at Gettysburg kept detailed records of the local weather. These excerpts from those records do not include humidity readings, which at high levels can make temperatures seem hotter.

"From June 15th until July 22nd, 1863, there was not an entirely clear day.... On the day before the battle, both at 7 a.m., and 2 p.m., the obscuration was again complete, with cumulo-stratus clouds moving from S.S.E. At 9 p.m., only four-tenths of the heavens were covered. During these days of somber suspense, the records of the wind are those of almost an entire calm. The thermometer [at Fahrenheit] registers as follows during the period:

	7 a.m.	2 p.m.	9 p.m.
June 25th,	59	51	63
June 26th,	60	63	62
June 27th,	61	63	67
June 28th,	63	67	68
June 29th,	66	72	69
June 30th,	68	79	71

All through the first day [of July], the entire sky was covered with clouds, viz: cumulo-stratus at 7 a.m. and 2 p.m.; and cirro-stratus at 2 p.m. A very gentle southern breeze, (2 miles per hour). Thermometer:

7 a.m.	2 p.m.	9 p.m.
72	76	74

At 8 a.m. [July 2nd], sky still covered, (cumulo-stratus). At 2 p.m., three-tenths are clear. At 9 p.m., there are cirrus clouds; wind as on preceding day. Thermometer:

7 p.m.	2 p.m.	9 p.m.
74	81	76

At 8 a.m. [July 3rd], sky again completely covered with cumulo-stratus clouds; at 2 p.m., only four-tenths of the heavens are covered, but with cumulus or the massive thunder-cloud of summer;

at 9 p.m., seven-tenths cumulus. Wind S.S.W., very gentle. Thunder storm in neighborhood at 6 p.m. The thunder seemed tame, after the artillery firing of the afternoon. Thermometer:

7 p.m.	2 p.m.	9 p.m.
73	87	76

Rain in showers at 6 p.m., from 2:15 to 4 p.m. [July 4th], and at 4 p.m. of the 5th, aggregating 1.330. Thermometer:

7 p.m.	2 p.m.	9 p.m.
69	72	70

...The maximum temperature for the month of July 1863, was 87 [degrees Fahrenheit], at the time of Pickett's charge...."

SOURCE: Records on file in the Gettysburg National Military Park.

Comments of some participants regarding the weather during the battle:

"Having become exhausted from fatigue and the excessive heat of the day..."
COL Oates, 15th AL, OR, p. 393

"The scene of action was reached by a march of several miles under a broiling sun..."
COL White, 7th GA, OR, p. 396


"The scene of action was reached by a march of several miles under a burning sun..."
MAJ McDaniel, 11 th GA, OR, p. 401

"Not withstanding the extreme heat and the fatiguing march..."
LTC Shepherd, 2d GA, OR, p. 420

"Owing to the excessive heat, dry weather, and dust, the march was a severe one..."
MAJ Eshleman, Wash Arty, OR, p. 433

SOURCE: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies...

SELECTED BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF UNION LEADERS



LINCOLN, Abraham.
1809-1865, KY

Lincoln was born in Kentucky and raised on the edge of the frontier, growing up with scant formal education. His family then settled in Ill., where Lincoln held various clerking jobs, and was partner in a grocery store that failed and left him heavily in debt. He studied law and his forceful character and honesty made him a favorite in the community and elected him to the state legislature as a Whig. Licensed as a lawyer in 1836, he settled in Springfield where he married Mary Todd in 1842. After one term in Congress (1847-49) he was not returned by his constituents and retired from public life.

While a lawyer for the Illinois Central Railroad he became acquainted with George McClellan (vice-president) and Ambrose Burnside (treasurer). It was also during this time he became acquainted with Edwin Stanton, having been temporarily hired by Stanton's law firm. In opposition to Stephen A. Douglas and the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Lincoln entered into the growing debate of sectionalism, joining the Republican party in 1856.

The famous Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858 ended in Douglas' election to the Senate, but Lincoln emerged as a powerful national figure. He was a serious contender for the Republican presidential nomination in 1860, and after his campaign managers struck a deal with Pennsylvania political boss Simon Cameron, that if elected Lincoln would name Cameron secretary of war, Lincoln gained the nomination (In Jan '62 Lincoln, unhappy with Cameron's performance, replaced him with Edwin Stanton).

When Lincoln was elected on 6 Nov '60 the South saw the end of their political power in the Union, and southern states began seceding. After the attack on Fort Sumter, S.C., in Apr '61, he called upon the various states to furnish 75,000 volunteers to put down the rebellion. Frequently advised by governors and congressmen, Lincoln selected many generals from

among leading politicians in order to give himself a broader base of political support. Some political generals, such as John A. Logan and Francis P. Blair, distinguished themselves, whereas others proved military hindrances. Other commissions were given to Regulars on active duty, former West Pointers like McClellan and Burnside, who had resigned to pursue business careers, or those who had held volunteer commissions in the Mexican War.

During the war Lincoln appointed and discarded a succession of commanding generals as he was subjected to repeated humiliation in the defeat of Union arms. After McDowell's defeat at First Manassas in Jul '61, he made McClellan commander-in-chief of all armies, and acquiesced in that commander's oblique movement with the Army of the Potomac against Richmond via the Peninsula. After this unsuccessful campaign, however, Lincoln relieved McClellan of supreme command, allowing him to retain command of the Army of the Potomac, and put John Pope in command of a separate Army of Virginia.

After Pope's defeat at Second Manassas (29-30 Aug '62) Lincoln reconsolidated both armies under McClellan, who led the hastily assembled force to block Lee's invasion of Maryland.

Earlier, Lincoln had drafted a proclamation freeing slaves in the rebellious states but withheld it because, after Union reverses, it might appear an act of desperation. When McClellan's army successfully halted Lee at Antietam (17 Sep '62), the Emancipation Proclamation was issued, changing the war's focus (heretofore fought to preserve the Union and not to disrupt the South's social fabric) to include ending slavery.

When McClellan failed to pursue Lee after Antietam Lincoln relieved him. The failure of McClellan's successors - Burnside at Fredericksburg (13 Dec '62) and Hooker at Chancellorsville (1-4 May '63) - added to Lincoln's perplexity and tended to discredit his ability in military matters. Meade's success at Gettysburg (1-3 Jul '63) was marred by the failure to pursue and crush Lee's army. Even under Grant, whom Lincoln brought East in the spring of 1864, there were months of sanguinary fighting with hope deferred.

Lincoln's political enemies mustered strength before the '64 election, and it looked as though he would be displaced in the White House by Democratic challenger George McClellan. But the military successes of Grant's overland campaign and Sherman's capture of Atlanta swung sentiment to him, and Lincoln was re-elected. He was assassinated by John Wilkes Booth on 14 Apr '65 at Ford's Theater, Washington, five weeks after his second inauguration and five days after Lee's surrender.



STANTON, Edwin McMasters
1814-1869, OH

In 1827 Stanton's father died, forcing the 13-year-old to leave school and work in a bookstore to supplement the family's income. He studied law in Columbus and was admitted to the bar in 1836. From 1849 to 1856 he was counsel for the state of Pennsylvania, establishing a national reputation. In 1859 he successfully defended Congressman Daniel Sickles in a celebrated Washington murder case, and in the waning days of the Buchanan administration he was appointed attorney general.

Nominally a Democrat, Stanton backed John C. Breckinridge in the election of 1860, and after Lincoln was inaugurated he returned to private life. In Jan '62 Lincoln offered him the position of secretary of war, which he accepted, sacrificing a yearly income of \$40,000 as a successful lawyer for a cabinet post of \$8,000.

With no military experience, he moved into office with zeal, fighting fraud and waste in the rapidly enlarged military. A capable organizer, he brought order out of chaos. He generally worked well with congressional leaders and generals in the field. However, when George McClellan, a personal friend, failed to perform adequately Stanton was one of the leading forces pushing for his removal. His manner and restrictions on the press earned him few friends and later led to some apparently unfounded charges that he was involved in the assassination of Lincoln.

After the war Stanton worked with the Radical Republicans in their efforts to secure harsher treatment for the South. This brought him into conflict with his new president, Andrew Johnson. Matters came to a head in 1868 when the president removed him from office. Congress reinstated him under the Tenure of Office Act but Johnson persisted, naming Grant as secretary of war. Stanton, however, barricaded himself in his office and Grant, supportive of Stanton, refused to take office. The crisis ended on 26 May '68 when Stanton finally resigned and resumed his legal practice.

In Dec '69, on Grant's election to the presidency, Stanton was named to the U.S. Supreme Court, but died four days after Congress confirmed the nomination.



HALLECK, Henry W.
1815-1872, NY
USMA 1839 (3/31); Engrs.

After graduating from West Point Halleck was assigned to work on the fortifications in New York Harbor, then toured Europe and inspecting fortifications. Afterwards he was invited by the Lowell Institute of Boston to deliver a series of twelve lectures on the elements of military art and science. When the Mexican War broke out Halleck, then a first lieutenant, was assigned to Monterey, California, where he filled varied and responsible positions. He was brevetted captain for gallantry "in affairs with the enemy" on 1 May '47. After the war he was an inspector and engineer of light-houses and acted a member of a board of engineers for fortifications on the Pacific Coast. He was promoted CPT, 1 Jul '53, but because of cuts in the army after the war and the hopeless future in a profession little rewarded by the government, he resigned 1 Aug '54. The same year he became head of the leading law firm in California, refusing offers to run for the U.S. Senate. Halleck later became director of the New Almaden quick-silver mine and a major general of California militia.

At the beginning of the Civil War Halleck was commissioned MG in the R.A. (19 Aug '61), and commanded the Department of the Missouri. The success of his subordinates, Grant and Foote at Donelson, Curtis at Pea Ridge, Pope at Island No. 10, and Grant at Shiloh, brought prestige to **Halleck's** department. The departments of Kansas and Ohio were added to his command on 11 Mar '62, and the whole named the Department of the Mississippi. Halleck then took to the field in person. Although his army had double the number of his opponent's forces, **Halleck's** labors in the field were not so meritorious as in the office. Though he captured Corinth he allowed the enemy's forces to escape and failed to pursue them with vigor. This movement ended **Halleck's** active campaigning, during which he was known to the soldiers as "Old Brains."

On 11 Jul '62, he was summoned to Washington and made military advisor to the President with the title of general-in-chief. Brusque, mathematical, direct, wholly impersonal and impartial, Halleck not only antagonized office seekers and politicians but also his subordinates far away in the field. His counsels to his generals were frequent and often superfluous and he

devoted much of his time to minutiae and the manner of raising soldiers and equipment.

On 12 Mar '64, after Grant was promoted to LTG, Halleck's status was changed from general-in-chief to chief of staff. Although the new office was more logical and appropriate to the work Halleck had been doing, it nevertheless was a demotion. Unlike other generals, who asked to be relieved or reassigned when they could not have positions to which they believed themselves entitled, Halleck pursued his duties with his same unflagging energy. On 19 Apr '65, after Appomattox, he was relieved from the office of chief of staff and three days later assigned to command the Military Division of the James, with headquarters in Richmond. On 30 Aug '65 he was transferred to command the Military Division of the Pacific with headquarters at San Francisco and on 16 Mar '69 he was placed in command of the Division of the South, at Louisville, Ky., his last assignment before his death.



MEADE, George G.
1815-1872, Spain
USMA 1835 (19/56); Arty.

Meade's first military assignment was to the 3d Artillery in Florida, at the outbreak of the Seminole War. After serving a year Meade was stricken with fever which rendered him unfit for active service, and he was sent to Watertown Arsenal, Mass., for ordnance work. There he resigned on 26 Oct '36 to become assistant engineer of the Alabama, Florida & Georgia Railroad. Six years later, after marrying Margaretta Sergeant, Meade applied for reinstatement in the army and was appointed 2LT of Topographical Engineers on 19 May '42.

As a military engineer Meade worked on the northeastern boundary survey until the end of 1843 when he was transferred to Philadelphia to work on the design and construction of lighthouses in the Delaware Bay. He was on that duty until Aug '45, when ordered to Aransay Bay, Texas, with Taylor's army of Occupation.

During the Mexican War, Meade, still with Taylor's army, participated in the battles of Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma and Monterey. He was later transferred to Scott's army, and

served on the general's staff along with a number of other West Point graduates, including Robert E. Lee. After the war Meade then returned to Philadelphia and lighthouse construction and making surveys and maps of the Florida reefs. From 1849 to 1850 he again served in Florida in service against the Seminoles, before returning once more to Philadelphia.

On 4 Aug '51 Meade was promoted 1 LT and returned to Florida, promoted CPT, 17 May '56, and then ordered to Detroit on the Geodetic survey of the Great Lakes. When the Civil War broke out he was made BG of vols, 31 Aug '61, and commanded a Pennsylvania brigade. Meade's first duty was in the defenses of Washington where he assisted in the construction of forts. In Mar '62 he transferred with his command to McDowell's army, and after the evacuation of Manassas he was sent to the Department of the Shenandoah.


In Jun '62 Meade was promoted MAJ in the R.A. and ordered to the Peninsula, commanding a brigade of the V Corps, Army of the Potomac. Participating in the battles of Mechanicsville, Gaines' Mill, and Glendale, he was seriously wounded at the latter battle, an injury that would trouble him the remainder of his life.

Before he was fully recovered Meade returned to field service and commanded a brigade of the III Corps, Army of Virginia, at Second Manassas (29-30 Aug '62). At Antietam (17 Sep '62) he was in temporary command of Reynolds' division, I Corps, Army of the Potomac, and when Hooker was wounded Meade assumed temporary command of the I Corps. On 29 Nov '62 he was promoted MG of vols, and when Reynolds succeeded to the command of Hooker's corps Meade was given command of Reynolds' division.

At the Battle of Fredericksburg (13 Dec '62) Meade's command temporarily broke through the Confederate right at Hamilton's Crossing, but was driven back. On 25 Dec '62 he was assigned command of the V Corps. At Chancellorsville (1-4 May '63) the V Corps formed the left of the army, but moved to the right flank after the rout of the XI Corps. Only a portion of Meade's command were engaged.

At the beginning of the Gettysburg campaign, while the army was moving northward, Meade was awakened in the early morning of 28 Jun '63 by a messenger from the President. At first believing he was being placed under arrest, Meade was surprised to learn he had been placed in command of the Army of the Potomac. Three days later, at Gettysburg (1-3 Jul '63), his army halted Lee's second invasion of the North. On the last day of the battle he was promoted BG in the R.A. and pursued the enemy back to Virginia. In the fall and winter of '63, Meade's army maneuvered against Lee's forces during the Rapidan and Mine Run campaigns before going into winter quarters.

When Grant, who had been made LTG in command of all Union forces in Mar '64, chose to accompany the Army of the Potomac, Meade's powers were mechanically curtailed and his work was relegated to the tactical rather than the strategical realm. He was promoted MG in the R.A. on 18 Aug '64, and remained commander of the Army of the Potomac until Appomattox (9 Apr '65). After the war he commanded the Military Division of the Atlantic and the Department of the East at Philadelphia. In 1868 he commanded the third military district of the Department of the South, comprising the states of Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, and then, in 1869, was again assigned the Military Division of the Atlantic.



CHAMBERLAIN, Joshua
1828-1914, ME

After graduating from a military school in Ellsworth, Maine, Chamberlain attend Bowdoin College and Bangor Theological Seminary. In 1855 he joined the Bowdoin faculty as instructor in natural and revealed religion, and over the course of several years taught rhetoric and modern languages, becoming a professor at Bowdoin in 1856, and then at Bangor five years later. Chamberlain was granted a leave of absence in '62 to study abroad but, over the protest of the college faculty, he enlisted as a LTC in the 20th Maine Infantry, participating in the battles of Antietam and Fredericksburg. He was slightly wounded during the latter action. He was promoted COL in May '63, in time to command his regiment at the Battle of Chancellorsville.

At the Battle of Gettysburg, two months later, Chamberlain performed with distinction in defending the Union left flank on Little Round Top, for which he was awarded the Medal of Honor. In the same he was again slightly wounded. In Nov '63 he went on temporary leave from field service suffering from malaria. After recuperating Chamberlain resumed command of the 20th Maine in May '64. He was assigned command of a brigade the following month and was severely wounded while personally leading an attack at Petersburg. After being promoted BG of vols on the spot by Grant Chamberlain was carried to the rear, not expected to survive. He did survive, however, and after convalescing in Maine returned to the army. He was wounded a fourth and fifth time during the Petersburg campaign, and later brevetted MG of vols. After Lee's surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, Chamberlain was designated to receive the formal surrender of arms and colors on 9 Apr '65. Refusing an appointment as COL in the R.A. on account of poor health, Chamberlain was mustered out of service in Jun '66. He returned to Maine to be elected Governor, a post he held through four elections, until 1871. Afterward he became president of Bowdoin College (1871-1883). Chamberlain was appointed U.S. surveyor of customs for the port of Portland in 1900, a post held until 1914, when he succumbed to the effects of his third wound.



HANCOCK, Winfield Scott

1824-1886, PA

USMA 1840 (18/25); Inf.

Hancock served on the frontier, in the Mexican War (1 brevet), and the Seminole War, and in Kansas during the border disturbances, and was later appointed chief Q.M. of the Southern District of California (until Aug '61). Named BG of vols in Sep '61, Hancock commanded a brigade of the IV Corps and later of the VI Corps during the Pensinsula campaign (13 Mar-18 May '62), and at the Battle of Antietam (17 Sep '62). He was promoted MG of vols (29 Nov '62) and commanded a division of the II Corps at Chancellorsville (1-4 May '63), then was assigned command of the corps (22 May-3 Jul '63). When Meade, then commander of the Army of the Potomac, first heard of the initial fighting at Gettysburg he sent Hancock forward to investigate. Hancock assisted in forming a defensive line and advised Meade to concentrate the entire army at Gettysburg. On the morning of 2 Jul '63 the II Corps occupied Cemetery Ridge. In the afternoon, when the III Corps collapsed under the weight of Longstreet's attack, Hancock personally forwarded reinforcements to weak points in the line. During Pickett's attack on 3 Jul the II Corps bore the brunt of the assault, and Hancock was severely wounded.

Hancock was promoted MAJ in the R.A. (30 Nov '63) and continued to command the II Corps through the battles of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, North Anna, Cold Harbor and the siege of Petersburg to Nov '64. He was promoted BG in the R.A. and first assigned to organize and command the 1st Corps of Veterans, then various departments until the end of the war. He was appointed MG in the R.A. in Jul '66. Hancock was an unsuccessful presidential candidate in 1880, losing to Garfield.



HOWARD, Oliver O.
1830-1909, ME
USMA 1854 (4/46); Ord.

Howard saw brief service in the Watervliet and Kennebec arsenals before becoming chief of ordnance in Florida during hostilities with the Seminoles (1857). He was promoted to 1LT 1 Jul '57, returned to West Point as instructor in mathematics, and remained there until Jun '61, when he resigned to become COL of the 3d Maine Infantry. Howard commanded a brigade at First Manassas (21 Jul '61), and was promoted BG of vols 3 Sep '61.

During the Peninsula Campaign Howard was wounded twice, losing his right arm at Fair Oaks (1 Jun '62) and did not return to duty until 27 Aug. Returning to field service he commanded a brigade of the II Corps at Antietam (17 Sep '62), assuming temporary command of the division after Sedgwick was wounded. Howard was promoted to MG of vols 29 Nov '62, and commanded a division of the II Corps at Fredericksburg (13 Dec '62).

On 1 Apr '63 he was assigned command of the XI Corps, composed mostly of Germans-Americans. Because he had displaced the popular (at least among the Germans) MG Franz Sigel, Howard was generally disliked by his troops. In addition they were not impressed with his reputation as a great Biblical soldier, "the Havelock of the Army." Having studied for the ministry in the Presbyterian Church, Howard was intensely pious and was a temperance leader. This led to friction between Howard and his commanding officer, Joe Hooker, whose reputation in the army was that of a profane and hard drinking womanizer. Hooker was not impressed with Howard's moral philosophy, later stating that Howard was a good deal more qualified to "command a prayer meeting" than an army corps. At the Battle of Chancellorsville (1-4 May '63), while Howard's corps held the army's right flank, Jackson's corps struck the surprised XI Corps in the flank and rear and it. When Hooker was ultimately forced to withdraw from the battlefield, the XI Corps, specifically the Germans, was held responsible for the failure of the campaign.

On the first day at Gettysburg (1-3 Jul '63) Howard's XI Corps again held the right flank of the army and, as at Chancellorsville, was outflanked and routed. The remnants of the corps fell back to Cemetery Ridge.

On 24 Sep '63 Howard's corps was ordered to Tennessee and participated in the battles around Chattanooga. On 10 Apr '64, after the XI and XII Corps' were consolidated to form the XX Corps, he was placed in command of the IV Corps, Army of the Cumberland. He took part in the battles around Atlanta and in Jul '64 was given command of the Army of the Tennessee, passing over Hooker, his senior in rank.

Howard and his command participated in the March to the Sea, the surrender of Savannah (21 Dec '64), and the surrender of the Confederate Army under Johnston (26 Apr '65).

On 12 May '65 Howard was appointed commissioner of the newly established Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands. He was instrumental in founding Howard University in Washington, D.C., and was its president from 1869 until 1874. In 1872 President Grant had sent Howard to the Southwest as a peace commissioner to the Apache Indians under Cochise (1872), with whom he concluded a treaty. In 1874 Howard commanded the Department of Columbia and in 1877 he commanded an Expedition against the Nez Perce Indians. The following year he was on an expedition against the **Bannocks** and Piutes. In 1881 he became superintendent of West Point and two years later took command of the Department of the Platte. Promoted MG in 1886 Howard commanded the Division of the East until his retirement in 1894.



REYNOLDS, John F.
1820-1863, PA
USMA 1841 (26/52); Arty.

Reynolds first assignments after graduation were garrison duties at various posts in Maryland South Carolina, Florida and Texas. He was promoted 1LT (18 Jun '46) and accompanied Taylor's army to Mexico, where he was brevetted CPT for bravery at Monterey

and MAJ for gallantry at Buena Vista. After the war Reynolds returned to garrison duty, this time at various posts in New England, and at New Orleans. Promoted CPT 3 Mar '55, he crossed the plains two years later in the campaign against the Mormons. After a short term of duty at Ft. Vancouver, Washington, Reynolds was appointed commandant of cadets at West Point, serving as instructor of arty, **cav**, and inf.

With the outbreak of the Civil War Reynolds was promoted LTC (14 May '61). Due to the influence of Pennsylvania Governor Curtin the Federal Government promoted Reynolds BG of vols on 20 Aug '61 and assigned him to a brigade of Pennsylvania Reserves, in the defenses of Washington. During the Peninsula campaign Reynolds' Pennsylvanians were assigned to the V Corps and participated at Mechanicsville and Gaines' Mill. At the latter battle Reynolds was captured and sent to Richmond. He was exchanged and returned to duty on 8 Aug '62, and assigned to command a division of Pennsylvania Reserves.

His command joined the III Corps of Pope's Army of Virginia on 21 Aug '62 where it participated at Second Manassas (29-30 Aug '62). At the request of Governor Curtin, Reynolds' was sent to Pennsylvania to command the state militia during the Maryland campaign. On 29 Nov '62 he was promoted MG of vols and returned to command the I Corps, Army of the Potomac. His corps participated at Fredericksburg (13 Dec '62), where a portion of his troops drove through the Confederate line at Hamilton's crossing, but were forced back. At Chancellorsville (1-4 May '63) the I Corps was held in reserve. Reynolds was promoted COL R.A. in early June.

On 28 Jun '63, after Meade assumed command of the army of the Potomac, he assigned Reynolds command of a wing, consisting of the I, III, XI Corps. While personally supervising the placement of I Corps troops during the opening stages of the battle of Gettysburg, on 1 Jul '63, Reynolds was shot and killed.



SEDGWICK, John
1813-1864, CT
USMA 1837 (24/50); Arty.

After graduation Sedgwick saw action in the Seminole War in Florida, 1837-1838, took part in supervising the removal of the Cherokee Indians west beyond the Mississippi, and served on garrison duty along the Maine-Canada border. He was promoted 1LT 19 Apr '39, later serving with Scott in the Mexican War, winning brevets to CPT at Contreras and Churubusco, and MAJ at Chapultepec. He was promoted to CPT 26 Jan '49, and MAJ in the 1st Cavalry Regiment, 8 Mar '55.

Sedgwick took part in the Mormon Expedition 1857-1858 and saw considerable action against various Indian tribes in the west during the same time. In Mar '61 Sedgwick was promoted to LTC in 2d Cavalry Regiment and in Apr COL of the 4th Cavalry Regiment. In Aug '61 he was appointed BG of vols and placed in command of a division guarding the Potomac near Poolesville, Maryland. Sedgwick then served with the Army of the Potomac, commanding a division of Sumner's II Corps through the Peninsula Campaign, was badly wounded at Frayser's farm (30 Jun '62), and promoted MG of vols 4 Jul '62. While leading his division at Antietam (17 Sep '62) he was twice more wounded.

In Feb '63 he returned to active duty and was assigned command of the VI Corps. At Chancellorsville (1-4 May '63) his command stormed Marye's Heights (3 May) and fought at Salem Church (3-4 May). At Gettysburg (1-3 Jul '63) the VI Corps arrived on the afternoon of 2 Jul and remained generally in reserve. Afterwards, Sedgwick commanded the right wing of the army (VI and V Corps), Sep-Dec '63, during the Rapidan and Mine Run campaigns.

On 4 May '64 he once again was assigned to command the VI Corps, and in Grant's overland campaign participated in the battle of the Wilderness (5-6 May '64). While directing artillery emplacements at Spotsylvania, 9 May '64, he was shot and killed by a sniper.



SICKLES, Daniel E.
1825-1914, NY

Sickles attended the University of New York, studied law, and was admitted to the bar in 1846. He was elected to the state legislature in 1847, and as corporation counsel for NYC in 1853 he was part of the commission that acquired the site of Central Park for the city. From 1853-1855 Sickles was in London as secretary of the U.S. legation, then served a term in the New York state senate, and was elected as a Democrat to Congress (1857-1861). In 1859, after shooting and killing his wife's lover, Sickles was found not guilty by reason of temporary insanity, the first use of that plea in American jurisprudence.

Sickles had been an officer of the New York militia since 1852 and with the outbreak of the Civil War, raised troops for the "Excelsior Brigade." In Jun '61 he was appointed COL of one of its regiments. He commanded a brigade of the III Corps, Army of the Potomac during the Peninsula campaign, and in Jul '62 he returned to New York to recruit for the Excelsior Brigade. Sickles was promoted in Sep '62 to BG of vols and returned to command a division of the III Corps at Fredericksburg (13 Dec '62).

In Mar '63, Sickles was promoted MG of vols and assigned command of the III Corps. At Chancellorsville (1-4 May '63) the III Corps occupied the right center of the Union army, the XI Corps on its right and XII on the left. On 2 May Sickles spotted Jackson's flanking column and struck the rear of Jackson's force at Chatharine Furnace. When the XI Corps gave way on the Union right flank, however, Sickles' command fell back to halt the Confederate advance on the Plank Road. That evening Sickles ordered one of his brigades on a night attack. In the darkness and dense woods the unit gallantly charged a breastwork, only to discover it belonged to the XII Corps. Later, the brigade charged and captured one of its own batteries, "but, on learning the mistake, of course relinquished it."

The III Corps arrived at Gettysburg (1-2 Jul '63) on the second day and was ordered to

hold the southern end of Cemetery Ridge at the Round Tops. Instead, Sickles moved his entire corps forward to what he considered better ground and was struck by Longstreet's attack, the III Corps losing almost half its men. Sickles was wounded in the attack and his leg amputated, ending his war service.

After a diplomatic mission to South America in 1865 he was military governor of South Carolina. In Jul '66 he was commissioned COL in the R.A., and in Mar '67 brevetted BG and MG for "gallant and meritorious service" at Fredericksburg and Gettysburg. Sickles was mustered out of volunteer service in Jan '68 and retired from the R.A. as MG Apr '69.

From May '69 to Dec '73 he was U.S. minister to Spain, causing some embarrassment to the U.S. Government by publicly advocating the annexation of Cuba. He was recalled as minister and moved to Europe for seven years before returning to the U.S. Sickles held various offices in NYC during the 1880s, being elected in 1892 to the U.S. House of Representatives. It was during this time he was instrumental in having the Federal government acquire Gettysburg acreage for a national military park. Having lost in the election of 1894 he retired to private life. In 1897 Sickles was awarded the Medal of Honor for action at Gettysburg.



SLOCUM, Henry W.
1827-1894, NY
USMA 1852 (7/43); Arty.

Slocum served on garrison duty in Florida and South Carolina until 1856. He then resigned to practice law, and was admitted to the New York bar in 1858. He was elected to the state legislature the following year and appointed COL of the state militia as instructor of artillery. At the outbreak of the Civil War Slocum volunteered his services to the state and was appointed COL of the 27th New York Infantry. He was wounded while commanding his regiment at the Battle of First Manassas (21 Jul '61).

While recuperating Slocum was promoted BG of vols (9 Aug '61), and assigned to the

defenses of Washington until Mar '62. He then returned to active field duty and was appointed division commander of the VI Corps, participating in the Peninsula campaign. On 4 Jul '62 Slocum was promoted to MG of vols. His division fought at Second Manassas (29-30 Aug '62), South Mountain (14 Sep '62), and was lightly engaged at Antietam (17 Sep '62).

On 15 Oct '62, Slocum was appointed commander of the XII Corps and at Chancellorsville (1-4 May '63), his command occupied the left center of the army, near the Chancellor House. About midnight on 2 May Slocum repelled what he assumed to be a Confederate attack. Instead, it turned out to be a night attack by elements of Sickles' III Corps. In his after action report Slocum states "I have no information as to the damage suffered by our troops from our own fire, but fear that our losses must have been severe."

At Gettysburg (1-3 Jul '63) Slocum's corps arrived in the evening of 2 Jul, occupying Culp's Hill. Later the corps moved to the Union left, to assist in repelling Longstreet's attack, then returned to Culp's Hill for the remainder of the battle.

In Sep '63 Slocum's XII Corps, along with Howard's XI Corps were sent west to reinforce Rosecrans' Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga, and both corps placed under command of Hooker, between whom and Slocum there was considerable friction.

In Apr '64, when the XI and XII Corps' were merged to form the XX Corps Slocum was placed in command of the District of Vicksburg until Jul, when he returned to command the XX Corps. His command participated in the Atlanta campaign and his troops were the first to enter the city on 2 Sep '64. Slocum was assigned command of the left wing of Sherman's army in the march through Georgia and the Carolinas, and his new command, consisting of the XX Corps and XIV Corps, were redesignated the Army of Georgia. After the surrender of Johnston's army in N.C., in Apr '65, Slocum commanded the Department of the Mississippi at Vicksburg, before resigning on 28 Sep '65.

In the post-war years Slocum resumed his law practice in Brooklyn, served as a Democrat in the U.S. Congress, 1868-70, and was commissioner of public works in Brooklyn in 1876. In 1882 he was elected to a third term in Congress.



**GENERAL G. K. WARREN AT THE SIGNAL STATION ON LITTLE ROUND TOP.
FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.**



SYKES, George
1822-1880, DE
USMA 1842 (39/56); Inf.

After graduating from West Point Sykes served in Florida and on the frontier until he joined the army under GEN Taylor in Texas. Later, in Mexico with Scott's army, Sykes participated in most of the campaigns, being brevetted CPT for gallantry at Cerro Gordo.

With the end of the war Sykes served again on the frontier, being promoted CPT in the R.A. (30 Sep '53). Promoted MAJ (14 May '61) he commanded a battalion of Regular infantry at Manassas, his unit acting as rear guard to the disorganized mob of volunteers which fled back to Washington. Sykes was appointed BG of Vols (28 Sep '61), and assigned to command first a brigade then a division of the V Corps. Composed mostly of Regular troops, Sykes' division participated in the Peninsula campaign (Mar-Jul '62) then moved north to join Pope's Army of Virginia. Sykes' command fought at Second Manassas (29-30 Aug '62) and was lightly engaged at Antietam (17 Sep '62), Fredericksburg (13 Dec '62) and Chancellorsville (1-4 May '63). Sykes was promoted MG of vols (29 Nov '62). When Meade, who was then V Corps commander, was appointed commander of the army in Jun '63 Sykes was assigned command of the corps. At Gettysburg (1-3 Jul '63) the V Corps was mainly in reserve, although some brigades participated in the fighting on Little Round Top on 2 Jul. The entire corps moved to both Round Tops the following day.

Sykes was promoted LTC R.A., in Oct '63, and upon the reorganization of the Army of the Potomac in early '64, was relieved from command. He then was assigned duty in Kansas, until mustered out of volunteer service in '66. The rest of his Regular army service was mainly on garrison duty in the west. Sykes was promoted COL of the 20th Infantry in '68, and served as its commander until his death.

SELECTED BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF CONFEDERATE LEADERS



DAVIS, Jefferson

1808-1889, KY

USMA 1828 (23/33); Inf.-Dragoons.

After West Point Davis spent the first seven years of his army career on the Northwest frontier. Eloping with Zachary Taylor's daughter, he resigned as 1LT (1835) and settled down in Mississippi as a planter, his wife dying three months after their marriage. In 1845 he remarried and was elected the same year to the US Congress, resigning the following year to fight in the Mexican War. He was severely wounded at Buena Vista while commanding a volunteer regiment known as the "Mississippi Rifles."

Davis declined the appointment of BG in the Regular Army in 1847 and instead was elected to the U.S. Senate. In 1853 he was appointed Secretary of War by Pierce, served four years then re-entered the Senate, serving there until Jan '61, when Mississippi seceded. Appointed MG of the State Militia, he was chosen provisional president of the government set up by the Confederate Congress at Montgomery, Ala., and inaugurated there on 9 Feb '61. In November he was elected to a six-year term of the permanent government at Richmond and inaugurated on Washington's Birthday in Feb '62.

As the war progressed, Davis kept a close hand upon the management of the Confederate armies. His war secretaries served as little more than clerks as Davis supervised the affairs of the department. To Lee alone does he appear to have conceded preeminence. He made frequent trips to the field, arriving at First Manassas as the fight was ending, and was under fire at Seven Pines. Later he toured the Western Theater. His handling of high command was extremely controversial. There were long standing feuds with Beauregard and Johnston, and his defense of generals such as Bragg and Pemberton irritated many in the South. On the political front his autocratic ways fostered a large and well-organized anti-Davis faction in

the Confederate Congress, especially in the senate. Issues arising from strong states rights sentiments did much to hamper Davis' efforts. When the President suspended habeas corpus, some states reacted by refusing to hold prisoners arrested under the act. The Georgia legislature even "nullified" Davis' act by declaring it unconstitutional. It was not uncommon for Confederate state governments to obstruct tax collection and to interfere with the process of conscription for constitutional reasons.

Newspapers proved to be a constant source of criticism of the government. The Richmond Examiner, The Charleston Mercury, and a number of other influential southern papers denounced the President regularly. Under these conditions Davis was never able to accumulate wartime powers in the Confederate Presidency such as Lincoln assumed in the North.

With the fall of Petersburg imminent Davis fled Richmond (2 Apr '65) with his cabinet for Danville, calling on his people to resist to the last and promising the recapture of the capitol. After Lee's surrender (9 Apr '65) the group turned south, where Davis was captured one month later at Irwinsville, Ga. He was held for two years at Fort Monroe, accused of complicity in the Lincoln assassination. He was finally released (13 May '67) and after travel in Europe, and several unsuccessful business ventures, he settled in New Orleans, where he died in poverty at the age of 82.



LEE, Robert E.
1807-1870, VA
USMA 1829 (2/46); Engrs.

Scion of a prominent Va. family, Lee served at Forts Pulaski, Monroe, and Hamilton, before being superintending engineer for the St. Louis harbor. In 1846 he was sent to San Antonio as assistant engineer but soon joined GEN Scott in the Vera Cruz expedition. During the Mexican War (1 wound, 3 brevets) Lee's extraordinary industry and capacity won him the lasting confidence and esteem of Scott and he emerged from the war with a brilliant

reputation. He then supervised the construction of Fort Carroll in Baltimore Harbor, until his appointment as superintendent at West Point (1852-1855). Being in Washington when John Brown made his raid on Harpers Ferry (1859), Lee was sent to capture the raiders with a force of Marines from the Navy Yard.

At the beginning of the Civil War, at Scott's urging, Lincoln offered Lee command of the Federal armies (18 Apr '61). Lee declined, and resigned two days later to take command of Virginia troops. After his first campaign in the field led to failure at Cheat Mountain, West Virginia (10-15 Sep '61), Lee commanded forces along the South Atlantic coast before being recalled to Richmond to serve as military advisor to President Davis. On 1 Jun '62, Lee succeeded J. E. Johnston (wounded during the Peninsula Campaign) in the command of the force that then became known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

Lee then embarked upon an offensive campaign known as the Seven Days Battles in which the Federal Army of the Potomac fell back from Richmond. With the immediate danger to the Confederate capitol ended Lee moved against a second Federal army, the Army of Virginia under John Pope. After defeating Pope at Second Manassas (29-30 Aug '62) Lee was determined to retain the initiative and crossed the Potomac into Maryland in his first invasion of the North. McClellan, having been placed in command of the combined troops of his own and Pope's forces, moved to counter the Confederate maneuver. When McClellan came into possession of Lee's march orders Lee was forced to concentrate his army along Antietam Creek near Sharpsburg, Md. In the Battle of Antietam (17 Sep '62) the two armies fought to a bloody stalemate and Lee recrossed the Potomac two days later.

After McClellan was replaced by Ambrose Burnside the new Federal commander attempted to move on Richmond by way of Fredericksburg. In the Battle of Fredericksburg (13 Dec '62) Lee successfully blocked the maneuver and both armies went into winter quarters.

In the spring, Lee achieved his military masterpiece at Chancellorsville (1-4 May '63), but his army was too weakened by the death of Jackson and dwindling supplies of manpower and material ever to recover its former combat effectiveness. Furthermore, the Federal armies were increasing in strength and proficiency and competent military leadership was finally being found. The high tide of the Confederacy was reached when Lee was unable to destroy the Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg (1-3 Jul '63) and was forced to retreat into Virginia.

Coming East from the simultaneous and equally decisive victory at Vicksburg, Grant assumed command of all Federal armies, formulated an over-all strategic plan, and then proceeded to destroy Lee's Army of Northern Virginia in a costly 11-month campaign of attrition. It was not until Feb '65 - two months before his surrender - that Lee was given over-all command of all Confederate armies. Accepting the presidency of Washington College, after the war, Lee served until his death (22 Oct '70) at the age of 64, and was buried there. (The name was later changed to Washington and Lee University.)



EWELL, Richard Stoddert
("Dick")
1817-1872, DC
USMA 1840 (13/42); Dragoons

Ewell served on the frontier, in the Mexican War (1 brevet), and in action against various Indian tribes before resigning 7 May '61 as CPT. He was commissioned COL, C.S.A., and took command of a camp of cavalry instruction before being appointed BG. He commanded a brigade at the Battle of First Manassas (21 Jul '61) and was promoted MG on 23 Jan '62. In the Shenandoah Valley he commanded a division under Jackson at Winchester and Cross Keys and went with him to the Peninsula, where he fought in the Seven Days campaign.

Ewell led his division at Cedar Mountain and Second Manassas, being wounded at the latter and losing a leg. Although his wound had not fully healed, Ewell returned to duty 23 May '63, now as LTG in command of the II Corps, Army of Northern Virginia. During the Gettysburg campaign he had to be lifted onto his horse and strapped to the saddle. During the ensuing battle a bullet imbedded itself in his new wooden leg, a souvenir he proudly exhibited for years. He was again wounded at Kelley's Ford (Nov '63) and led his corps at the Wilderness and Spotsylvania, until poor health compelled his retirement from active service. Ewell was subsequently given command of the defenses of Richmond until its evacuation. On the retreat to Appomattox he was captured at Saylor's Creek (6 Apr '65) and was not paroled until 19 Aug '65. After his release Ewell resided in Tennessee until his death in 1872.



HILL, Ambrose Powell
1825-1865, VA
USMA 1847 (15/38); Arty

Hill served in the Mexican War, the Seminole wars and on the frontier before resigning 1 Mar '61 as 1LT. He was commissioned COL of the 13th Virginia Infantry, and served in West Virginia and at First Manassas (21 Jul '61). Stationed in Northern Virginia during the winter of 1861-1862, Hill was appointed BG (26 Feb '62) and placed in command of a brigade. His command fought at Williamsburg, after which he was promoted MG (26 May '62). Hill led commanded a division at Mechanicsville, Gaines Mill and Frayser's Farm. Called "Hill's Light Division" for its speed in marching, Hill's command was transferred to Jackson's corps after Hill quarreled with Longstreet. Under Jackson, the Light Division fought at Cedar Mountain (9 Aug '62) and Second Manassas (29-30 Aug '62).

In the Antietam Campaign Hill's division was one of several under Jackson assigned to capture Harpers Ferry. After the surrender of that post (15 Sep '62) Jackson's forces rejoined Lee at Sharpsburg, while Hill's division remained to parole Federal prisoners. On 17 September Hill led his men on a 17 mile forced march to rejoin Lee. In the afternoon, as Burnside's IX Corps was threatening to turn Lee's right flank, Hill arrived and drove the Federals to the banks of Antietam Creek.

At Fredericksburg (13 Dec '62) Hill's command occupied Hamilton's Crossing, south of the town, and helped repel the Union attacks of Meade and Gibbon.

Hill marched with Jackson during Chancellorsville (1-4 May '63) and, upon Jackson's wounding, succeeded to corps command until wounded himself. Named LTG (23 May '63), Hill took command of the newly created III Corps, leading it through the battles of Gettysburg (1-3 Jul '63) and Wilderness (5-6 May '64), during both of which he was ill with prostatitis.

Hill was on sick leave during the period 8-21 May '64, during which Ewell assumed temporary command of the III Corps. Hill rejoined his corps for North Anna, Cold Harbor, and the Petersburg campaign. In late Mar '65 he was again away on sick leave. On 2 April, while returning to his unit at Petersburg he was shot and killed by a Union straggler.



LONGSTREET, James ("Pete")

1821-1904, SC

USMA 1842 (54/56); Inf.

Longstreet served in the Seminole wars, the Mexican War (1 wound, 2 brevets), and on the frontier before resigning 1 June '61. Appointed BG, C.S.A. 17 Jun '61, Longstreet commanded a brigade at First Manassas (21 Jul '61). He was promoted MG, 7 Oct. '61, and commanded a division at Yorktown and Williamsburg, Fair Oaks and Seven Pines. In the reorganization that followed the Peninsular campaign Longstreet was given command of a wing containing over half of Lee's infantry. During Second Manassas (29-30 Aug '62) his command fell on the Union left flank to route the Federals. At Antietam Longstreet's command held the Confederate right flank. He was promoted LTG on 9 Oct '62. Shortly thereafter his command was reorganized and designated the First Corps, Army of Northern Virginia. At Fredericksburg (13 Dec '62) his corps performed with distinction, throwing back multiple attacks on Lee's left flank. In Feb '63 Longstreet was sent to the Suffolk, Virginia as temporary commander of the Confederate Department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia.

Rejoining Lee's army after Chancellorsville (1-4 May '63), Longstreet joined the army's march into Pennsylvania. He was opposed to the Gettysburg campaign in general and instead favored an offensive by Lee in the West. But since Lee was determined to invade Pennsylvania, Longstreet felt the campaign should be strategically offensive but tactically defensive and had the erroneous impression that Lee subscribed to this theory. His delay in attacking on the second day at Gettysburg, and his perceived lethargy in organizing "Pickett's

Charge" on 3 Jul exposed him to the most vindictive criticism by Southerners after the war. However, Lee never gave any intimation that he considered Longstreet's failure at Gettysburg more than the error of a good soldier.

In Sep '63 Longstreet was sent with two of his divisions to support Bragg's army in the West. After the Battle of Chickamauga he was sent to oppose Burnside in the Knoxville Campaign. In '64 he led his command back to join Lee for the Wilderness campaign and was seriously wounded on 6 May '64 by his own men, almost precisely a year after Jackson had been mortally wounded under similar circumstances nearby. Longstreet was out of action until 19 Oct, when he was put in command of the forces at Bermuda Hundred and north of the James River. Longstreet joined Lee's army on its retreat to Appomattox where he surrendered (9 Apr '65). After the war he became president of an insurance company and joined the Republican party. He was at one time Minister Resident to Turkey.



PICKETT, George E.

1825-1875, VA

USMA 1846 (59/59); Inf.

After graduating from West Point Pickett saw combat duty in the Mexican War, where he was brevetted twice for gallantry. Afterwards he served at various posts on the frontier.

In Jun '61, Pickett resigned his Regular commission to accept the rank of COL in the Confederate army. After serving on the lower Rappahannock River, he was promoted to BG (Feb '62) and commanded a brigade under Longstreet during the Peninsula campaign. Wounded at the Battle of Gaines Mill Pickett did not return to duty until after the Battle of Antietam, when he was given command of a division. He was promoted MG (Oct '62) and his division was lightly engaged at Fredericksburg (13 Dec '62). During the Battle of Chancellorsville (1-4 May '63) Pickett's division was at Suffolk, Virginia collecting supplies. Rejoining the main army in time for the march on Gettysburg Pickett's division arrived on the field early on the morning of 3 Jul. Lee had originally intended for Longstreet's three

divisions to lead the attack that day, but after Longstreet argued against the use of Hood's and McLaws' divisions Lee organized a task force of Pickett's division and six brigades of Hill's corps. The ensuing attack, known as "Pickett's Charge," failed. After the assault Pickett's division mustered less than one thousand of the four and a half thousand men engaged, with only one field officer not wounded or killed. In consequence of these losses Lee assigned Pickett's division to provost duty guarding prisoners on the retreat South.

In Sep '63 Pickett's division was sent to recuperate and recruit in Department of Virginia and North Carolina. Pickett's division participated in the battles at New Berne (Jan '64) and Drewry's Bluff (May '64), then rejoined Lee's army, participating in the siege of Petersburg and the subsequent retreat westward. When most of his division was captured during the retreat, and the remnants merged with other commands, Pickett was relieved of command and authorized to return home. However, he chose to remain, surrendering with the army at Appomattox.

Although offered a generalship by the Khedive of Egypt and the position of U.S. Marshal by President Grant, Pickett declined both to enter the insurance business in Virginia.




STUART, James Ewell Brown
("Jeb")

1833-1864, VA
USMA 1854 (13/46);
Mounted **Rifles-Cav.**

Stuart served on the frontier in Indian fighting (seriously wounded) and in Kansas during the border disturbances. While on a leave of absence he was Lee's volunteer aide during the capture of John Brown at Harpers Ferry (1859). Stuart resigned from the R.A. on 3 May '61, he determined to follow his state, although his Virginia-born and West Point educated father-in-law, Philip St. George Cooke, stayed with the Union. Stuart was commissioned


LTC of Virginia infantry on 10 May '61 and 14 days later was named CPT of cavalry. During that summer he was stationed at Harpers Ferry and First Manassas. He was appointed BG, on 24 Sep '61. At the beginning of the Peninsular campaign Stuart's cavalry fought at Williamsburg, and in Jun '62 participated in the "ride around McClellan." Stuart's command fought in the Seven Days' Battles and at Harrison's Landing, before his promotion to MG (25 Jul '62). He then took command of all the cavalry in the Army of Northern Virginia. He led his command at Second Manassas (29-30 Aug '62), and at Antietam (17 Sep '62) his horse artillery held Lee's left flank near the Potomac River.

Stuart commanded his cavalry division at Fredericksburg and briefly served as acting commander of the II Corps (3 May '63) at Chancellorsville after Jackson's wounding. In the Gettysburg campaign Stuart's Cavalry Corps fought at Brandy Station (9 Jun '63) and in a number of cavalry skirmishes before attempting to ride around the Union army. His command became separated from the main army, however, and he did not rejoin Lee's army until the evening on 2 Jul, at Gettysburg. The following day Stuart's cavalry fought on the Confederate left, but was held in check by Gregg's cavalry. In the spring of '64 Stuart fought in the Wilderness and Spotsylvania campaigns, and at the Battle of Yellow Tavern, where he was mortally wounded (11 May '64), while attempting to block Sheridan's raid on Richmond. He died the next day.



THE CHARGE OF **PICKETT, PETTIGREW, AND TRIMBLE**. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH FROM THE UNION POSITION,


UNITED STATES IN 1861



1863	EAST	WEST	
JAN.	Hooker Replaces Burnside	VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN	
FEB.		Period of Unsuccessful Attempts	
MAR.		OPERATIONS AGAINST PORT HUDSON	
APR.	CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN		Operations West of New Orleans
	Chancellorsville	Grant Crosses the Mississippi	
MAY		Jackson Champion's Hill Siege Begins	Siege of Port Hudson Begins
	GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN	TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN	
JUNE	Lee Crosses the Potomac Meade Replaces Hooker		
	Gettysburg Lee Recrosses the Potomac	Surrender	Surrender
JULY		CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN	OPERATIONS IN EAST TENNESSEE
AUG.		Bragg Evacuates Chattanooga	
SEPT.	OPERATIONS ALONG ORANGE & ALEXANDRIA RY.	Chickamauga Union Retreat to Chattanooga	Burnside Captures Knoxville
OCT.	Lee Crosses the Rapidan Confederates Retire	CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN Thomas Replaces Rosecrans Supply Line Cleared	
NOV.	Lee Recrosses the Rapidan Mine Run	Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge	Longstreet Sent to Knoxville Confederate Assault
DEC.			Siege Raised

CHAPTER 1

The Face of Battle and the Leader



We can learn much from studying past battles. This is especially true when we look for the human dimension in war—confidence, morale, courage—and the leadership required to inspire these qualities of the human spirit. The following case shows the human side of small-unit combat. It reveals the attributes of leadership required to deal with the stress of battle.

PAST BATTLE

As you read this case, focus on the following questions:

- How did the leaders carry out their major responsibilities—accomplishing the mission while looking out for the well-being of their soldiers?
- How did the leaders on both sides influence their soldiers' courage and will to fight?
- What leadership actions caused one side to be defeated?
- What leadership actions caused success?

The Face of Past Battle

The fight at Little Round Top on 2 July 1863 between the 20th Maine Regiment and two Alabama regiments—the 15th and the 47th—provides a case study of leadership and unit cohesion in battle. It *gives* us a picture of leadership in one of the most significant small-unit actions in the Civil War.


The 20th Maine marched more than 100 miles in the 5 days before the fight. On 1 July, they had just stopped to bivouac when a staff officer galloped up with orders to continue the march immediately. There was no time to eat. The situation was urgent. A decisive battle had begun that day between General Lee's invading Confederate Army and the Union Army at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. All Union Army units were badly needed by the next day.

The soldiers would always remember that strange night. A rumor ran through the ranks that the beloved General McClellan was back in command of the Union Army. A more incredible rumor was that General George Washington's spirit had been seen riding with them on a white horse! Both rumors raised morale.

At about 0200 they stopped to sleep. At 0400—again without food—they continued their march, reaching Gettysburg around noon. They were allowed to rest for several hours.

The 20th Maine was one of four regiments in the brigade commanded by Colonel Strong Vincent. About 1600, as the 20th Maine was moving to its assigned defensive position, an officer rode up and spoke excitedly to Colonel Vincent. There was much gesturing toward a rocky hill called Little Round Top. The soldiers of the 20th Maine did not know it then, but because of a series of mistakes, this key terrain was unprotected.

General Buford's two cavalry brigades had been defending it, but after taking over 50 percent losses the previous day, they were allowed to withdraw. The Army commander *assumed* that the cavalry commander would



**INITIAL POSITIONS
AT GETTYSBURG,
ABOUT 4 P.M.
JULY 2, 1863**

Map from John J. Pullen, *The Twentieth Maine*, p 101.

replace Buford's unit. But the cavalry commander did not think he was supposed to replace it. Wrong assumptions, failure to communicate clearly, and failure to check had left Little Round Top unguarded.

At about 1545 General Warren, the Army's chief engineer, climbed to the top of Little Round Top to observe enemy movements. He saw its importance to the battle and, to his horror, realized it was unguarded. General Warren sent for help. This led to a staff officer going to Colonel Vincent and explaining the need for troops on the hill. Colonel Vincent immediately volunteered his brigade to defend Little Round Top.

The soldiers of the 20th Maine watched as Colonel Vincent gave orders to his staff, galloped to Little Round Top, and disappeared into the trees. During the 15 minutes remaining before the Confederates attacked, Colonel Vincent did an outstanding job of reconnaissance of terrain and selection and occupation of a defensive position. His brigade followed him up Little Round Top.

Colonel Vincent led the 20th Maine to its position. He told Colonel Chamberlain, "This is the left of the Union line. You understand. You are to hold this ground at all **costs!**"

Chamberlain quickly gathered his company commanders and stressed the importance of their mission. He ordered them to move into a defensive line with the right flank company firmly anchored on the 83d Pennsylvania Regiment and the left flank on a large boulder that he pointed to. He showed them the trace of ground he wanted defended. He ordered them to move into a line by using a battle drill maneuver to form a defensive line two ranks deep. This ensured that all companies were tied in on their flanks and that a soldier was ready to fight the moment he was in position.

After placing his regiment, Chamberlain's thoughts turned to his exposed left flank. He studied the terrain there, dominated by Big Round Top. The soldiers saw him gazing intently at Big Round Top. They remembered past battles where he had shown a skill common to all good combat leaders. He could study the terrain closely, imagine the possible dangers, and take actions in advance to guard against them.


He realized the disaster that would occur if the enemy got around his weak left flank. So he ordered Captain Morrill to take B Company toward Big Round Top for 100 or 200 meters, screen the left flank, and take appropriate actions. Captain Morrill positioned his company behind a stone wall at the base of Big Round

⁷⁶John J. Pullen, *The Twentieth Maine*, p 111.

Top. They were soon joined by 14 US sharpshooters who had been driven back from their earlier positions by General Hood's attacking division.

The 20th Maine's defensive line was barely in position when they were fiercely attacked all along their front. An officer reported to Chamberlain that he had seen a large body of troops moving behind the attacking Confederates. Climbing up on a rock, Chamberlain saw the force moving to attack his exposed left flank. B Company would not be able to stop this large force.

Chamberlain had to think fast and creatively. Nothing in the tactical manuals covered this type of situation. His companies were in a defensive line, two ranks deep, as shown below.



Quickly analyzing the situation, he ordered his company commanders to extend left and back to block the flank attack. Pointing to the large boulder at the left end of the line, he ordered the new line to be formed there—at right angles to the existing line. (See dashed line in diagram on page 7.) This meant that each company would cover twice the normal defensive frontage. Their defense would be thin—one rank deep. To deceive the enemy, Chamberlain directed that the maneuver be achieved while continuing the same volume of fire to the front.

The noise of heavy fire made normal voice control impossible. Still, the regiment performed this difficult, unpracticed tactic with remarkable speed and coordination. It was as if the entire regiment had seen the move diagramed and had rehearsed it several times. Each soldier and squad moved together, keeping up the fire and avoiding gaps in the defense. After the battle, the survivors of the 20th Maine would always marvel at how well and how quickly they accomplished that maneuver under fire! It was a unique combination of tactical battle drills—created in the mind of Colonel Chamberlain to fit the particular situation on that day.

Minutes after the new line was formed, it was attacked by the fierce, battle-hardened soldiers of the 15th Alabama Regiment. (This regiment and the 47th Alabama Regiment were under the command of Colonel Oates.) Because they had marched all-night and all day, they were tired. And because they were unable to wait for a lost watering party sent out just prior to the attack, they were thirsty. Even so, they attacked with great courage and violence.

From this point on, the battle was so fierce that none of the participants were able to describe exactly what happened. For the soldiers involved, the battle took on the quality of a dream. Chamberlain saw that

⁴Pullen, p 118.

a cross fire had demolished the center of his line. The color bearer and a single comrade were gallantly defending the entire center. Chamberlain filled the gap with his brother and an orderly.

The Alabama Regiments charged at least six times. Chamberlain said that at times there were more of the enemy around him than of his own soldiers. Squads of attacking Confederate soldiers bayoneted their way through the defenses, but somehow they were thrown back by the determined Maine men. Many soldiers on both sides were killed or wounded during this phase of the battle. Chamberlain was wounded in the foot by a flying shell fragment. His thigh was severely bruised where a bullet had struck his sword scabbard.


A lull in the battle came after the sixth violent charge. Chamberlain knew he was outnumbered and that each of his soldiers had only one or two rounds of ammunition. He then showed his ability to analyze the important forces in a situation and to choose the course that had the best chance of success. He learned that the Confederates were forming for another charge. He knew his unit, out of ammunition, would be overpowered by the superior numbers and firepower of another Confederate assault. To withdraw would cause the defeat of the Union Army.

His mind searched for a solution and it came. He would fix bayonets and charge—not for heroics, but because that was their best chance for success. He reasoned his unit would have the advantage of attacking downhill. Furthermore, the surprise and violence of the attack might take the initiative from the enemy and give the 20th Maine the psychological advantage.

That decision left Chamberlain with a tactical problem that the manuals did not address. He had to keep the two halves of his regiment together. Therefore, he ordered the left flank to charge first, anchoring its right flank company in place.

When the left half of the regiment was abreast of the right half, the entire regiment was to charge down and to the right—like a great swinging door—the right flank company firmly hinged on the 83d Pennsylvania Regiment.


After Chamberlain gave the order, young Lieutenant Melcher leaped in front of his company, sword flashing in the sun. Already under attack, the left half of the regiment charged, driving the Confederates before them. When the left half of the regiment was abreast of the right, Chamberlain strode forward, leading his men down and to the right. The regiment was a raging body, charging toward the Alabama soldiers 30 yards away. Before the Alabamans could fire, the 20th Maine



**THE CHARGE OF
THE 20TH MAINE**

was upon them. At point-blank range a Confederate officer fired his pistol at Chamberlain. He missed and handed his sword to Chamberlain in surrender—as Chamberlain's sword was at the officer's throat.

The Confederates were stunned. They fell back to the position of the 4th and 5th Texas Regiments. There the 20th Maine charge might have failed if not for a great stroke of surprise—that powerful weapon of war that explodes in the mind, destroys reason, and incites panic. Captain Morrill's B Company and some US sharpshooters were hiding behind a wall at the base of Big



**THE 20TH MAINE
ON LITTLE
ROUND TOP**

Round Top. They had not been able to see the 15th Alabama moving to attack Chamberlain's left flank. After the 20th Maine's charge, however, the retreating Alabamans came into view. Captain Morrill's force started firing into the flank and rear of the Confederates.

According to Colonel Oates, it was the devastating surprise fire of B Company that caused panic in his soldiers. They thought a large force of Union cavalry was attacking their rear—even though there was no Union cavalry in the battle. Colonel Oates and his company commanders thought they were surrounded. He ordered a retreat—each man to break out as best he could. At that point the two Alabama regiments panicked and ran. They did not realize that one more attack could have started the entire Union line tumbling like a house of cards.



THERE IS NO
SUBSTITUTE FOR
LEADERSHIP
BY EXAMPLE

Colonel Oates said later that General Lee was never so close to victory as that day on Little Round Top. He also said that he never knew a greater regiment than the 20th Maine, or a greater leader than their gallant colonel.

The 20th Maine swept their brigade's entire front. They wanted to keep attacking General Lee's whole army. Some were yelling that they were "on the road to Richmond." That Colonel Chamberlain was able to stop them is a tribute to the discipline of the unit. They had captured about 400 prisoners from four different Confederate regiments. The slopes of Little Round Top were littered with hundreds of dead bodies—blue and gray. The 20th Maine started the battle with 358 riflemen; they suffered 90 casualties. Forty were killed or died of wounds.

For a few moments, the fate of an Army and a nation rested on the shoulders of 358 farmers, woodsmen, and fishermen from Maine. They were led by a colonel who had been a teacher of languages less than a year before the battle.

Colonel Chamberlain's leadership at Little Round Top demonstrates the kind of creative, thinking leadership we will need, at all levels, to succeed on the modern battlefield.

It is important to trace the development of Chamberlain, his subordinate leaders, and the 20th Maine. They came together as a volunteer regiment in August 1862—knowing little about war. They knew only that someone was trying to break up the Union, and that was unacceptable to them. Most had a deep belief in the Union and in the ideals of America.

Initially, Chamberlain was the lieutenant colonel of the regiment under Colonel Adelbert Ames. Ames had won the Medal of Honor at the First Battle of Bull Run. He was a professional.

[~]Willard M. Wallace, *Soul of the Lion*. p 103.

Ames was a hard, fair disciplinarian and an excellent trainer. He led by example. He taught the officers and NCOs how to be professional leaders. He set up an individual training program called the school of the soldier and a collective training program, the school of the company and regiment. He trained the trainers.

Every night after taps Ames gave Chamberlain a special course in tactics. Together, Chamberlain and Ames read and discussed books such as Jomini's *Art of War*. Colonel Ames put the regiment through hundreds of hours of dusty, complex battle drill so they could function as a team under the enormous stress of battle. This paid off when they had to extend and protect their left flank at Little Round Top.

The regiment fought in two battles prior to Little Round Top, and the soldiers gained real respect for Ames, Chamberlain, and their other officers and NCOs. At Antietam in September 1862, and at Fredericksburg in December 1862, the leaders led by example, heading off panic through cool, imaginative thinking, giving the unit real confidence.

In April 1863, Colonel Ames was promoted to general and given command of a brigade. At that time Chamberlain assumed command of the 20th Maine and was promoted to colonel.

Between battles, the 20th Maine trained constantly. Sound leadership, good training, and tough combat experience developed the unit into a cohesive, disciplined regiment. By the time Chamberlain took command, he and his subordinates were professionals. They had mastered the knowledge and skills required of soldiers at that time. In addition, they had developed a consciousness of the regiment. They felt a part of something bigger and more important than themselves. Strong bonds of confidence, trust, and respect made them a cohesive unit that fought well throughout the war.

For his day of courage and skill at Little Round Top, Joshua Chamberlain received the Medal of Honor. He became one of America's most remarkable soldiers. Fourteen horses were shot out from under him, and he was wounded six times. At Petersburg, leading his brigade in a charge on a strongly fortified Confederate position, he was severely wounded in both hips. General Grant promoted him to brigadier general for his bravery—the only instance of ~~on-the-field-of-battle~~ promotion in the war.

Five months after his terrible wound, Chamberlain left the hospital against doctors' wishes and returned to the front, barely able to walk or ride. From January 1865 through the surrender at Appomattox in April 1865, Chamberlain suffered terrible pain and seriously weakened health. But his was a triumph of spirit and character over the body. His heroic leadership during the campaign in March and April 1865 led to crucial Union victories at Quaker Road and Five Forks.

In the battle on Quaker Road on 29 March, Chamberlain was leading his brigade in an attack on the Confederate defenses. A bullet passed through the large muscle of his horse's neck, hit a metal mirror in his shirt pocket, penetrated the skin, followed his ribs around to his back, and came out the other side of his coat. Horse and rider slumped, bleeding profusely.

When he regained consciousness, Chamberlain saw the entire right of his attacking brigade retreating, about to panic. Hat gone, blood all over his chest and head, he spurred his bleeding horse to the center of the retreating troops—ordering them to turn and attack. Awed by his courage and will, they attacked and won the battle.

That victory—made possible by Chamberlain's leadership—seriously weakened the Confederate position. It was critical in leading to General Lee's surrender within

2 weeks. For his "conspicuous gallantry" on the Quaker Road, General Grant promoted Chamberlain to major general.

Grant chose Chamberlain to command the special honor division of veteran brigades formed to receive the surrender of arms and colors of General Lee's Army at Appomattox. The 20th Maine was among the units chosen for this honor. At the surrender, Chamberlain saw the once great Confederate Army, dejected in defeat, starting to march past his division. Feeling deep respect for the great Confederate soldiers, Chamberlain shocked the world by ordering his division to present arms. This gesture of human compassion sparked pride and an answering respect from the Confederates. Those who were there thought Chamberlain's gesture a fitting end to the tragic struggle to save the Union.



Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain had the professional values and character traits that we seek to instill in today's soldiers and leaders. He was tactically and technically proficient. He was an expert soldier. He understood human nature. He focused his attention on accomplishing his mission while looking out for the well-being of his soldiers. He had the attributes of honorable character, professional knowledge, and inspirational leadership that are explained and illustrated in this manual.

We can develop leaders like Joshua Chamberlain in our schools and in our units. You can become this kind of leader, and you can teach your subordinates to be this kind of leader. This is your challenge and responsibility.

SELECTED OFFICIAL MESSAGES

The following messages were extracted from The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1889.

UNION MESSAGES

JUNE 13, 1863—7 p. m. (Received 7.45 p. m.)

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK:

All my sources of information confirm the statement that Longstreet's and Ewell's corps have passed through Culpeper and Sperryville, toward the Valley. The instructions of the President, approved by yourself, and your original letter of instructions, compel me, in view of this movement of the enemy, to transfer the operations of this army from the line of the Aquia to the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Accordingly, directions have been given for the First, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Corps to rendezvous at Manassas Junction with the cavalry. The Second, Sixth, and Twelfth, with the Reserve Artillery, after covering the withdrawal of Government property from depots, have been directed to march to Dumfries, and from thence to be governed by the movements of the enemy, the object being to bring the two wings together as far in advance on that line as the movements of the enemy will justify.

The corps will be withdrawn from their positions on the river to-night, the line being held by pickets until the proper time arrives for their withdrawal. To-morrow p. m. my headquarters will be at Dumfries.

JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Fairfax Station, June 16, 1863—11 a. m.

His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
President, &c.:

You have long been aware, Mr. President, that I have not enjoyed the confidence of the major-general commanding the army, and I can assure you so long as this continues we may look in vain for success, especially as future operations will require our relations to be more dependent upon each other than heretofore.

JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Fairfax Station, June 16, 1863—7.30 p. m.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:

In compliance with your directions, I shall march to the relief of Harper's Ferry. I put my column again in motion at 3 a. m. to-morrow. I expect to reach there in two days, and, if possible, earlier. The partial rest of to-day was not lost, being necessary to recruit from forced and heavy marches and fill up supplies.

My headquarters at Farrall [?] Station to-morrow night.

JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-General.

(Copy to the President.)

WASHINGTON, *June* 16, 1863—10 p. in.

Major-General HOOKER :

To remove all misunderstanding, I now place you in the strict military relation to General Halleck of a commander of one of the armies to the general-in-chief of all the armies. I have not intended differently, but as it seems to be differently understood, I shall direct him to give you orders and you to obey them.

A. LINCOLN.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *June* 16, 1863 — 10.15 p.

Major-General HOOKER,
Army of the Potomac:

I have given no directions for your army to move to **Harper's** Ferry. I have advised the movement of a force, sufficiently strong to meet Longstreet, on Leesburg, to ascertain where the enemy is, and then move to the relief of Harper's Ferry, or elsewhere, as circumstances might require. With the remainder of your force in proper position to support this, I want you to push out your cavalry, to ascertain something definite about the enemy. You are in command of the Army of the Potomac, and will make the particular dispositions as you deem proper. I shall only indicate the objects to be aimed at. We have no positive information of any large force against Harper's Ferry, and it cannot be known whether it will be necessary to go there until you can feel the enemy and ascertain his whereabouts.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE **POTOMAC**,
Fairfax Station, June 17, 1863.

Major-General HALLECK,
Commanding, &c.:

Telegraph operator just reports to me that Harper's Ferry is abandoned by our forces. Is this true ?

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOSEPH **HOOKER**,
Major-General, Commanding.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *June* 17, 1863 — 2.10 p. **m.**

Major-General HOOKER,
Headquarters, Army of the Potomac:

I regret equally with you that reports from north side of the Potomac are so unreliable and contradictory, but they are given to you as received. What is meant by abandoning Harper's Ferry is merely that General Tyler has concentrated his force in the fortifications on Maryland Heights. No enemy in any force has been seen below Harper's Ferry, north of the river, and it is hoped that Tyler's cavalry may get something reliable above. So far, we have had only the wild rumors of panic-stricken people.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

JUNE 17, 1863 — 2 p. in. (Received 4 p. **m.**)

Major-General HALLECK :

Advice of the abandonment of Harper's Ferry renders forced marches unnecessary to relieve it. This army will be in position as follows to-night : One corps at Dranesville; one corps at Guilford Station ; one corps on Goose Creek, near Trappe Rock ; one corps at Gum Springs; one corps at Centreville; one corps at Sangster's Station; one corps at Fairfax Station. Headquarters at Fairfax Station to-night. Cavalry feeling up through Aldie toward Winchester.

JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-General.

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 17, 1863-7.45 p. m.
Major-General HOOKER,
Army of the Potomac:

My telegram of this morning [afternoon] has informed you what is meant by the abandonment of Harper's **Ferry**—a mere change of position. It changes in no respect the objects you are to keep in view.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Poolesville, Md., June 27, 1863. (Received 9 a. m.)
Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:

That there may be no misunderstanding as to my force, I would respectfully state that, including the portions of General **Heintzelman's** command, and General Schenck's, now with me, my whole force of enlisted men for duty will not exceed 105,000. Fourteen batteries of the Artillery Reserve have been sent to Washington. Of General Abercrombie's force, one brigade has just been sent home from expiration of service, and the others go shortly. One brigade of General Crawford's force has not reported with it. I state these facts that there may not be expected of me more than I have material to do with.

My headquarters at Frederick to-night. Three corps at Middletown, one corps at Knoxville, two at Frederick, and the remaining infantry corps very near there to-night.

JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-General.

(Copy for President.)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 26, 1863-7 p. in. (Received 7.30 p.
Major-General HALLECK:

Is there any reason why Maryland Heights should not be abandoned after the public stores and property are removed ?

I propose to visit the place to-morrow, on my way to Frederick, to satisfy myself on that point. **It** must be borne in mind that I am here with a force inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, and must have every available man to use on the field.

JOSEPH **HOOKER**,
Major-General, Commanding.

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 27, 1863-10.30 a. in.
General HOOKER,
Army of the Potomac:

Major [James C.] Duane and Captain [George H.] Mendell were ordered to your army, and it is presumed that they are *en route*. I do not know where they now are, unless in your army. Maryland Heights have always been regarded as an important point to be held by us, and much expense and labor incurred in fortifying them. I cannot approve their abandonment, except in case of absolute necessity.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

SANDY HOOK, *June* 27, 1863-1 p. m.
(Received 3 p.

Maj. Gen. H. **W. HALLECK**,
General-in-Chief:

My original instructions require ~~me~~ to cover Harper's Ferry and Washington. I have now imposed upon me, in addition, an enemy in my front of more than my number. I beg to be understood, respectfully, but firmly, that I am unable to comply with this condition with the means at my disposal, and earnestly request that I may at once be relieved from the position I occupy.

JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-General.

WASHINGTON, D. C.,
June 27. 1863—S p. m.

Major-General HOOKER,
Army of the Potomac:

Your application to be relieved from your present command is received.

As you were appointed to this command by the President, I have no power to relieve you. Your dispatch has been duly referred for Executive action.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D. C., June 27, 1863.

Maj. Gen. **GEORGE G. MEADE**,
Army of the Potomac:

GENERAL. You will receive with this the order of the President placing you in command of the Army of the Potomac. Considering the circumstances, no one ~~ever received~~ a more important command; and I cannot doubt ~~that~~ you will fully justify the confidence which the Government has reposed in you.

You will not be hampered by any minute instructions from these headquarters. Your army is free to act as you may deem proper under the circumstances as they arise. You will, however, keep in view the important fact that the Army of the Potomac is the covering army of Washington as well as the army of operation against the invading forces of the rebels. You will, therefore, maneuver and fight in such a manner as to cover the capital and also Baltimore, as far as circumstances will admit. Should General Lee move upon either of these places, it is expected that you will either anticipate him or arrive ~~with~~ him so as to give him battle.

All forces within the sphere of your operations will be held subject to your orders.

Harper's Ferry and its garrison are under your direct orders.

You are authorized to remove from command, and to send from your army, any officer or other person you may deem proper, and to appoint to command ~~as you~~ may deem expedient.

In fine, general, you are intrusted with all the power and authority which the **President**, the Secretary of War, or the General-in-Chief can confer on you, and you may rely upon our full support.

You will keep me fully informed of all your movements, and the positions of your own troops and those of the enemy, so far as known.

I shall always be ready to advise and assist you to the ~~utmost of~~ my ability.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

FREDERICK, MD., June 28, 1863—7 a. m.
(Received 10 a. m.)

General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:

The order placing me in command of this army is received. As a soldier, I obey it, and to the utmost of my ability will execute it. Totally unexpected as it has been, and in ignorance of the exact condition of the troops and position of the enemy, I can only now say that it appears to me I must move toward the Susquehanna, keeping Washington and Baltimore well covered, and if the enemy is checked in his attempt to cross the Susquehanna, or if he turns toward Baltimore, to give him battle. I would say that I trust every available

man that can be spared will be sent to me, as from all accounts the enemy is in strong force. So soon as I can post myself up, I will communicate more in detail.

GEO. G. MEADE,
Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Frederick, June 28, 1863—1 p.
(Received 2.20 p.)

Major-General HALLECK

Am I permitted, under existing circumstances, to withdraw a portion of the garrison of Harper's Ferry, providing I leave sufficient force to hold Maryland Heights against a *coup de main*?

GEO. G. MEADE,
Major-General.

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 28, 1863-3.30 p. m.
Major-General MEADE,
Frederick, Ltd.:

The garrison at Harper's Ferry is under your orders. You can diminish or increase it as you think the circumstances justify.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

TANEYTOWN, July 1, 1863—12 m.

General HALLECK:

Dispatch sent last night giving my position at Emmitsburg, Gettysburg, and Hanover.

Ewell is at Heidlersburg. A. P. Hill is massed behind the mountains at htown. Longstreet somewhere between Chambersburg and the mountains.

The news proves my advance has answered its purpose. I shall not advance any, but prepare to receive an attack in case Lee makes one. A battle-field is being selected to the rear, on which the army can be rapidly concentrated, on Pike Creek, between Middleburg and Manchester, covering my depot at Westminster.

If I am not attacked, and I can from reliable intelligence have reason to believe I can attack with reasonable degree of success, I will do so; but at present, having relieved the pressure on the Susquehanna, I am now looking to the protection of Washington; and fighting my army to the best advantage.

1 P. M.

The enemy are advancing in force on Gettysburg, and I expect the battle will begin to-day.

GEO. G. MEADE.

CONFEDERATE MESSAGES

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,

July 31, 1863.

GENERAL : I have the honor to submit the following outline of the recent operations of this army, for the information of the Department :

The position occupied by the enemy opposite Fredericksburg being one in which he could not be attacked to advantage, it was determined to draw him from it. The execution of this purpose embraced the relief of the Shenandoah Valley from the troops that had occupied the lower part of it during the winter and spring, and, if practicable, the transfer of the scene of hostilities north of the Potomac. It was thought that the corresponding movements on the part of the enemy to which those contemplated by us would probably give rise, might offer a fair opportunity to strike a blow at the army then commanded by General Hooker, and that in any event that army would be compelled to leave Virginia, and, possibly, to draw to its support troops designed to operate against other parts of the country. In this way it was supposed that the enemy's plan of campaign for the summer would be broken up, and part of the season of active operations be consumed in the formation of new combinations, and the preparations that they would require. In addition to these advantages, it was hoped that other valuable results might be attained by military success. Actuated by these and other important considerations that may hereafter be presented, the movement began on June 3.

Respectfully submitted.

R. E. LEE,
General.

General S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,

June 15, 1863-7 a. m.

Mr. PRESIDENT . On the 10th, I put Ewell's corps in motion for the Valley: He reports, under date of the 13th, that, with Rodes' division, he drove the enemy out of Berryville, and, with Early's and Johnson's, drove him within his intrenchments at Winchester, where, it seems, he is more strongly fortified than supposed. According to our understanding, I presume he has advanced toward the Potomac, leaving a division in front of Winchester. General A. P. Hill reported yesterday that the Federal force in front of him withdrew from the south side of the Rappahannock on the night of the 13th, and by morning had nearly all disappeared, leaving strong pickets on the river. One division was seen going over the Stafford Hills, in the direction of Aquia, and he supposes the main body to have taken that route. Our scouts report a general movement of the enemy up the Rappahannock, but I have got no certain information on that point ; I know a large force has been thrown toward Warrenton. The uncertainty of the reports as to threatened expeditions of the enemy along the coast of North Carolina, and between the Rappahannock and James Rivers in Virginia, has caused delay in the movements of this army, and it may now be too late to accomplish all that was desired. I am still ignorant as to the extent of the expedition said to be moving up the Peninsula, and hesitate to draw the whole of A. P. Hill's corps to me. Two of Pickett's brigades are at Hanover Junction and Richmond, so that I am quite weak.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE,
General.

His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS,
President Confederate States.

HEADQUARTERS,
Near Millwood, Va., June 19, 1863.

Mr. **PRESIDENT**: General Ewell, with two divisions, has advanced from the Potomac toward Pennsylvania. His third division is retained near Shepherdstown for the present, to guard his flank and rear. General Longstreet's corps on the Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps roads threatens the enemy, who is massed between him and Washington. General Stuart's cavalry is operating in his front. I hope the first division of A. P. Hill's corps will reach here to-day, so that Early may be relieved and follow Ewell. All attempts of the enemy to penetrate the mountains have been repulsed by Stuart's cavalry, who, yesterday, again drove him from Middleburg, and, by reports received last evening, the enemy's infantry have evacuated Aldie. Indications seem to be that his main body is proceeding toward the Potomac, whether upon Harper's Ferry or to cross the river east of it, is not yet known. The difficulty of procuring supplies retards and renders more uncertain our future movements.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE,
General.

His Excellency **JEFFERSON DAVIS**,
President, &c., Richmond, Va.

BERRYVILLE, June 20, 1863.

Mr. **PRESIDENT**: I have the honor to report, for the information of Your Excellency, that General Imboden has destroyed the bridges on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, over Ewart's Creek, near Cumberland; the long bridge across the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, below Cumberland; the iron bridge across the North Branch of the Potomac, with the wooden trestle adjoining it; the double-span bridge across the mouth of Patterson's Creek; the Fink's patent iron bridge across the mouth of the South Branch of the Potomac, three spans of 133* feet each, and the wooden bridge over Little Cacapon.

All the depots, water-tanks, and engines between the Little Cacapon and Cumberland are also destroyed, with the block-houses at the mouth of the South Branch and Patterson's Creek.

The Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, about 2 miles above Old Town, where the embankment is about 40 feet high, has been cut, and General Imboden reports that when he left it the entire embankment, for about 50 yards, had been swept away.

A similar crevasse, with like results, was also made in the canal, about 4 miles below Old Town.

Lieutenant-Colonel White, of the cavalry, has also cut the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad east of the Point of Rocks.

General Milroy has abandoned the south side of the Potomac, occupying Harper's Ferry with a picket, and holds the Maryland Heights with about 8,000 men.

General Ewell's corps is north of the Potomac, occupying Sharpsburg, Boonsborough, and Hagerstown. His advance cavalry is at Chambersburg, Pa.

The first division of General A. P. Hill's corps will reach this vicinity to-day; the rest follow.

General Longstreet's corps, with Stuart's cavalry, still occupy the Blue Ridge, between the roads leading through Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps, holding in check a large force of the enemy, consisting of cavalry, infantry, and artillery.

The movement of the main body of the enemy is still toward the Potomac, but its real destination is not yet discovered.

I have thought this a favorable time for General Sam. Jones to advance into Western Virginia, and have so informed him. Should he not be able to accomplish anything more, he will fix the attention of the enemy in that region, and prevent re-enforcements being sent to other points. If any of the brigades that I have left behind for the protection of Richmond can, in your opinion, be spared, I should like them to be sent to me.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE,
General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
June 23, 1863.

Mr. PRESIDENT: Reports of movements of the enemy east of the Blue Ridge cause me to believe that he is preparing to cross the Potomac. A pontoon bridge is said to be laid at **Edwards Ferry**, and his army corps that he has advanced to Leesburg and the foot of the mountains, appear to be withdrawing. Their attempts to penetrate the mountains have been successfully repelled by General Stuart with the cavalry. General Stuart **last** night was within a few miles of Aldie, to which point the enemy had retired.

General Ewell's corps is in motion toward the Susquehanna. General A. P. Hill's corps is moving toward the Potomac; his leading division will reach **Shepherdstown** to-day. I have withdrawn Longstreet west of the Shenandoah, and, if nothing prevents, he will follow to-morrow. In addition to the supplies that we have been able to gather in Fauquier and Loudoun Counties, in the Shenandoah Valley, and west of the Alleghany, we have collected sufficient north of the Potomac for the support of Ewell's corps to the **30th** instant; and **1,300** barrels of flour are on hand in Maryland for the rest of the army. I hope we shall get enough for the subsistence of our men. Forage is very scarce, and we have mainly to rely on *grass* for the animals. From the reports I receive, I believe we shall obtain enough salt for our purposes while north of the **Potomac**, for which we are paying 75 cents a bushel. The flour that we have purchased in Maryland costs \$6.50 per barrel; beef, \$5 per **hundred**, gross. We use Confederate money for all payments. I shall continue to purchase all the supplies that are furnished me while north of the Potomac, impressing only when necessary.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE,
General.

His Excellency President DAVIS, *Richmond*.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
Near Gettysburg, Pa., July 4, 1863.

Mr. PRESIDENT: After the rear of the army had crossed the Potomac, the leading corps, under General Ewell, pushed on to **Carlisle** and York, passing through **Chambersburg**. The other two corps closed up at the latter place, and soon afterward intelligence was received that the army of General Hooker was advancing. Our whole force was directed to concentrate at Gettysburg, and the corps of Generals Ewell and A. P. Hill reached that place on the 1st July, the former **advancing** from Carlisle and the latter from Chambersburg. The two leading divisions of these corps, upon reaching the vicinity of Gettysburg, **found** the enemy, and attacked him, driving him from the town, which was occupied by our troops.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE,
General.

His Excellency President DAVIS, *Richmond*.